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Back to the Future: Does Apprendi Bar a
Legislature's Power to Shift the Burden of Proof Away
from the Prosecution by Labeling an Element of a
Traditional Crime as an Affirmative Defense?

The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Due Process
Clause' of the United States Constitution to require the prosecution in a
criminal trial to prove "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which [the defendant is being] charged."' The Court's interpretation is
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the
thoughtful guidance of Professor Bennett L. Gershman. I would also like to thank Roy Galewski,
Victoria Oswald, Mavis Ronayne, Audrey Friedichsen, Delight Wilson, and Dave Williams for invaluable research assistance.
I
"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 I .
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970); see, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,477
(2000) (holding that any fact which may increase the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224,239 (1998) (holding that the existence of a prior conviction is appropriate
to enhance the penalty of a conviction and need not be included in the criminal indictment); Martin v.
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228,23 1-32 (1987) (holding that it was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to lace the burden of ~rovinaself-defense on the defendant charged with
committing aggravated murder); McMillan v. ~ h n s ~ l v k i477
a , U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (holding that a
sentencing enhancement which constitutes an element of the crime does not violate due process if it is
considered only after the defendant has been convicted of the underlying offense); patterson v. New
York. 432 U.S. 197,204 (1977) (holding that an affirmative defense that does not negate any facts of
the crime which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is not violative of due process, but
constitutes a separate issue upon which the defendant carries the burden of persuasion); Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975) (holding that the state cannot shift to the defendant the burden of
proving that he acted in the heat of passion to reduce his charge from homicide to manslaughter because it was incumbent upon the state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in
the heat of passion during the commission of the crime). In Winship, the Court stated: "Lest there
remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Winship, 397
U.S. at 364; see also Thomas V. Mulvrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Dejned?, 12

'
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fundamental to the jurisprudential principle that a defendant may not be
convicted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each essential element of the crime. he outer limits of this principle, however, allow legislatures and courts to shift this heavy burden of proof away from the prosecution by including in its criminal statutory scheme that which may not
necessarily define the corpus of the crime, but which potentially threatens a
defendant's liberty.3
Consider the following scenarios:
(1) A defendant enters a building and declares: "This is a robbery and I
have a gun." Congress defines bank robbery as attempting to take property
The prosecution will succeed in
from a Federal bank by force or ~iolence.~
its case if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended
to enter a bank and that she threatened violence. If the prosecution is successful, the defendant may be sentenced to up to twentyiears in jail.' Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the sentence is increased if the de~
fendant threatens death during the perpetration of the ~ r i r n e .Therefore,
the prosecution can increase the defendant's punishment if it can prove, by
a lesser burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence), that the defenAM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y195 (1997) (examining the historical development of the reasonable doubt
standard, problems with defining the standard, other potential definitions based on international models, and possible solutions to provide clarity to jurors).
See, e.g., Martin, 480 U.S. at 233 (holding that defendant's burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she was acting in selfdefense when she committed murder does not violate
the Due Process Clause); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205-06 (holding that defendant's due process rights
were not violated by requiring him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense
of acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress); United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340,342
(3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S.959 (2001) (placing the burden on the defendant of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the elements of a justification defense when raised in response to a
felon-in-possession charge); United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1298-99 (1 lth Cir.), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000) (holding that a justification defense is an affirmative defense that may be
raised on a felon-in-possession charge, but the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove justification
by a preponderance of the evidence because the defense does not negate an element of the crime);
United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (maintaining that the defendant must establish all four elements of a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence). But see United
States v. Talbott, 78 F.3d 1183,1186 (7th Cir. 19%) (allowing the defendant to merely raise a justification defense and then shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not justified in possessing a weapon). For a discussion on the burden of proof distinction between elements and defense, see Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable
Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1665 (1987):
In light of the connection between the reasonable doubt rule and the due process legality principle, the distinction between elements and affirmative defenses appears
untenable; the risk of unjust conviction is no less urgent in the context of affirmative
defenses. Neither deference to historical practice nor concern for legislative flexibility can justify the judicial distinction.
Dripps, supra, at 1667.
18 U.S.C. 5 2113 (2000).
Id.
6

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 2B3.1@)(2) (2001).
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dant's words "I have a gun" threatened violence of deaths7
(2) A defendant intentionally stabs his wife after finding her with another man. The New York State Legislature defines murder as the intentional killing of another, punishable by life in p r i s ~ n .Under
~
the statute,
the defendant is entitled to a lesser punishment if he acted under extreme
emotional disturbance? If the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intentionally killed his wife, then the defendant
may be punished for life. However, if the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was so distraught at the sight of his wife
with another man that he acted with extreme emotional disturbance, then
his punishment may be significantly reduced."
In each instance, the duration of the defendant's punishment is
determined by proof of particular elements as outlined by the legislature.
Because of legislative definition, however, the prosecution need not prove
each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt." Specifically, the
legislature can define which elements are "fact[s] necessary to constitute
the crime," requiring the prosecution to present proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for conviction of a crime and which elements merely define the punishment boundaries of the crime, thereby allowing proof by a lesser standard.'* With this power comes the legislature's ability to circumvent the
procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause. By designating an element as a "factor that bear[s] solely on the extent of punishment," the legislature exempts from strict scrutiny elements that directly affect the duration
7

See United States v. Carbaugh, 141 F.3d 791,792 (7th Cir. 1998). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, if a defendant makes an express threat of death, punishment is increased by two levels. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL
8 2B3.l(b)(Z) (2001).
N.Y. PENALLAW 5 125.25 (West 1998).
Id.
10
Id.
II
See, e.g.,N.J. STAT.ANN. $5 2C:43-7(a), 2C:44-3(e) (West 1995) (authorizing an extended
term of imprisonment for hate crime); see also United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340,342 (3d Cir. 2000)
(concluding defendant charged with the unlawful possession of a firearm must prove all elements of an
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292,
1298-99 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (holding defendant's assertion of an affirmative defense may require the
defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79,85-86 (1986) (applying 42 PA. CONS. STAT.5 9712 (1998), defendants who are convicted of
felonies are subject to mandatory minimum sentences when it is found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a tirearm during the felony offense); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a state may shift the burden of disproving an
element of a crime to the defendant so long as the presumed fact is rationally connected to a proven
fact); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1977) (holding that N.Y. PENALLAW 8 125.25,
which requires the defendant being charged with second-degree murder to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, does not violate the Due hocess Clause).
I2
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). These elements usually take the form of sentence
enhancements, which aggravate the length of punishment for a particular crime or affirmative defense,
which eliminate or decrease the punishment for a crime.
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of a defendant's loss of liberty.
The legislature's ability to define "elements that bear solely on the extent of punishment" prompted judicial concern for legislative abuse in eviscerating the Due Process Clause. In the mid-1970s, Mullaney v. Wilbur14
held that the Maine State Legislature could not mask an element of a
substantive crime by calling that element a defense." However, one year
later, the Court, in ~attersonv. New york,I6 reversed its decision, holding
that the extreme emotional distress provision included in New York's
murder statute was not an essential element of the crime." It was,
therefore, permissible within constitutional guidelines for the New York
Legislature to include in its murder statute an element that did not require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt within the definition of the substantive
offense.'' The Patterson rule seemed to control decisions in this area of
the law for the next twenty years.
Most recently, however, the Court has decided a series of cases
suggesting that, at least where sentence enhancements are concerned, it is
interested in returning to the strict construction of M~llaney.'~
In Jones v.
l3 Apprendi

v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466,485 (2000) (quoting Winship, 421 U.S. at 698).
U.S. 684 (1975).
l5 I d . at 702. The Court held:
[Plroving that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation
is similar to proving any other element of intent; it may be established by adducing
evidence of the factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the homicide.
And although intent is typically considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant, this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the
burden to him.
Id. See generally Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting a Burden of Production on the Defendant Before
Admitting Evidence that Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L.
REV. 272 (1997) (positing that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proof on the defendant for
the introduction of evidence relating to a third party's guilt).
l6 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
,
.
I' The Court reasoned:
This affirmative defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting "the
defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to
the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them," does
not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to
convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required
to carry the burden of persuasion.
Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted).
18
See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 236 (1987) (upholding an Ohio criminal statute that
places upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an affirmative
defense, and stating that "Patterson [was] authority for our decision"); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 83 (1986) (holding that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act "creates no
presumption as to any essential fact and places no burden on defendant; [nor does] it . . . relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proving guilt") (internal citations omitted).
l9 See, eg., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466,477 (2000) (holding that any fact which may
increase the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction, must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,377-79 (1999) (holding that
aggravating factors in a death penalty sentencing decision must have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to be applied); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998) (holding
that the existence of a prior conviction is appropriate to enhance the penalty of a conviction and need
l 4 421
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United States 20 and Apprendi v. New Jersey:' the Court, relying in part on
Mullaney, held that the legislature might not relieve the prosecution of its
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that enhances the defendant's senten~e.~'By including some items that increase penalties and
must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court
resurrected the fundamental principle of Mullaney. The Court concluded
that a legislature may not circumvent the protections of the Due Process
Clause "merely by redefin[ing] the elements that constitute different
crimes, [and] characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent
of punish~nent."~~
Scholars maintain that these recent decisions could portend an end to
the defendant's burden to prove affirmative defenses.24 This Article considers whether it would be sound to extend the Apprendi rule to affirmative
not be included in the criminal indictment); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (holding that a sentencing enhancement which constitutes. an element of the crime does not violate due process if it is considered
only after the defendant has been convicted of the underlying offense).
While noting that we had just last year expressed serious doubt concerning the constitutionality of allowing penalty-enhancing findings to be determined by a judge by
a preponderance of the evidence Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the
court concluded that those doubts were not essential to our holding. Turning then, as
the appeals court had, to McMillan, as well as to Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the court undertook a rnultifactor inquiry and then held
that the hate crime provision was valid. In the majority's view, the statute did not allow impermissible burden shifting, and did not "create a separate offense calling for
a separate penalty." [State v. Apprendi,] 159 N.J., at 24,731 A.2d, at 494 [(1999)].
Rather, "the Legislature simply took one factor that has always been considered by
sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the weight to be given that factor."
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 472-73.
20 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
21
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
22 See Jones, 527 U.S. at 240-52; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The Court in Apprendi also acknowledged Judge Stevens' concumng opinion in Jones, in which he stated "[ill is unconstitutional for
a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53 (Steven, J., concumng)).
23
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (quoting Winshi), 421 U.S. at 698) (alteration in original).
24 See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND.L. REV. 1467 (2001) (discussing the Apprendi decision and developing a multi-factor test that courts can use to determine when
a statute contains 'hon-elements" of a crime, as codified by a legislature, that in actuality appear to be
essential elements of a crime that would otherwise necessitate the state to prove their existence beyond
a reasonable doubt); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGSL. J. 457 (1989) (discussing approaches taken by courts to deal with issues raised by the
presumption of innocence and advocating a return to the use of a broad reasonable doubt rule); see also
Andrew J . Fuchs, The Eflect ofApprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: BlurL. REV. 1399
ring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements o j a Crime, 69 FORDHAM
(2001) (analyzing and interpreting the Apprendi decision's impact). Fuchs provides two possible
interpretations of the Apprendi decision; a broad interpretation that all sentencing guidelines are now
invalidated and a narrower interpretation that the jury must decide every fact that constitutes an individual offense. Fuchs, supra; see also Everhart, supra note 15, at 286-93 (discussing the burdens of
proof required for affirmative defenses as explicated by the Court).
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defenses. Part 11 of this Article considers the historical foundation of the
Due Process Clause and the evolution of the assignment of the burden of
proof for affirmative defenses and sentencing factors. Part I1 also reviews
Mullaney and its progeny through the most current case, Apprendi. Part 111
discusses the Court's model for determining which categories of statutory
language constitute elements requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and which are "nonessential element[s] of an offense." Part IV evaluates
whether it is appropriate to assign the defendant the burden of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant under the post-Apprendi construct and
considers the likelihood and wisdom of returning Mullaney to its full constitutional vigor. Ultimately, this Article concludes that while extending
the Apprendi rule to affirmative defenses would not be inconsistent with
recent Court decisions, it would be inappropriate because the Court's reasoning for curtailing the legislature's ability to shift the burden of proof for
sentence enhancements is not applicable to affirmative defenses.
11. THEJUDICIAL
LIMITATIONS
OF THE DUEPROCESS
CLAUSE

A premier tenet of the American criminal justice system is that the
prosecution has the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.25 The Constitution does not specifically require the
prosecution to bear this particular burdemZ6 However, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Fifih and Fourteenth Amendments to protect the accused "against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
In Win~hip,~'
Justice Brennan held that the Due Process Clause requires the
prosecution to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt of "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged."" In25

See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (holding that "materiality" of
statements bearing upon the crime with which the defendant is charged must be submitted to a jury for
a determination of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993)
(holding that the use of a definition of reasonable doubt that was previously held unconstitutional
cannot be considered a harmless error); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977) (holding that
a state need not "disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative
defenses related to the culpability of an accused"); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (holding that an Oregon statute requiring defendant to prove insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt did
not violate Due Process Clause because it did not negate the state's requirement to prove all necessary
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Paul A. Hemesath, Proof Issues, 89 GEO.
L.J. 1644 (2001) (summarizing the reasonable doubt standard, affirmative defenses, and presumptions
in crimjnal jurisprudence).
26
See Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Dejnition, 108 HARV.L. REV. 1955,1955
(1995) (positing that courts should not attempt to define the reasonable doubt term when explaining the
conc t to juries).
"47
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); see also U.S. CONST.amend. V (stating that "[nlo
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST.
amend. XN, 1 (stating that "[nlo State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law").
28 397 U.S. 358 (1 970).
29 Id. at 364.
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deed, this requirement is "a pervasive, historically ingrained requirement in
criminal trials."30
Although Winship guaranteed the defendant strong constitutional safeguards, it provided courts with little guidance regarding what facts are
"necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged."" Legislatures and prosecutors argued that the prosecutor's new burden did not extend to those aspects of a crime that increased or decreased sentencing or provided exculpation or justification of the crime charged.32 The Winship decision, it has
been argued, exempts the prosecution from the burden of proving every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt where sentencing factors
and affirmative defenses are concerned.33
The limits of the Winship decision first presented itself for clarification
in Mullaney v. Wilbur. In Mullaney, the Supreme Court considered the
boundaries of the Winship rule.34 The prosecution charged the defendant,
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., with first-degree murder and manslaughter under
State v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 689,690 (Or. 1991); see State v. Glass, 5 Or. 73 (1873).
U.S. at 364.
-32
In Mullaney, the state argued that Winship should not apply since the fact in question, sentencing, does not come into issue until the jury has already determined guilt of the defendaht. Thus, the
argument continued, the defendant's critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of paramount concern since he is likely to lose his liberty and suffer stigmatization already. See Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S.684,697 (1975).
33 See Gerald E. Lynch, Towards A Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the
Special Part, 2 BUFF.CRIM.L. REV.297 (1998). For many years, it has been uncertain precisely
which determinations are sentencing factors and which are elements of the crime. Basically, as Professor Lynch wrote, the legislature determined what constituted an element. See id. at 316-17. Once the
legislature said that a fact was not an element necessary to constitute a crime, the stringent due process
requirements on the prosecution ceased to exist. See id. at 323.
An "affirmative defense" is any defense that assumes the complaint or charges to
be correct but raises other facts that, if true, would establish a valid excuse or
justification or a right to engage in the conduct in question. An affirmative defense
does not concern itself with the elements of the offense at all; it concedes them. In
effect, an affirmative defense says, "Yes, I did it, but I had a good reason."
State v. Cohen, 568 So.2d 49,51-52 (Fla. 1990).
Affirmative defenses are also defined by the Model Penal Code as defenses that
are "peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused." It is easy to see why defenses
such as insanity and self-defense constitute affirmative defenses. First, the details of
the defense really are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. But the details of the third-party guilt defense are not 'peculiarly within the knowledge of the
accused." In fact, information concerning suspects other than the accused is often
peculiarly within the knowledge of the police or the prosecution.
Second, a defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right to raise an affirmative defense. Therefore, since the government has the greater right to eliminate
the defense entirely, the government has the lesser right to place limitations or burdens of proof on the exercise of the gratuitously granted state right. But an accused
does have a constitutional right to adduce evidence "tending to show that a third
party committed the crime charged." Hence, because the state "lacks the greater
power to exclude the evidence entirely," the state is also prohibited from placing
limitations (i.e., burdens of proof) on the defendant's constitutional right to admit
third-party guilt evidence.
Everhart, supra note 15, at 291-92 (citations omitted).
34 Mulloney, 421 U.S. at 697-701.
O'

31 Winship, 397
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Maine's penal code." Although the defendant admitted to fatally assaulting the victim, at trial he claimed that he attacked the victim in a "fienzy"
which was provoked by the victim's homosexual advances.36
The Maine Penal Code defined murder and manslaughter as separate
crimes.37 The murder statute required the prosecution to prove that the
defendant acted with malice.38 The manslaughter statute allowed for a
lesser sentence than murder if the defendant killed in the heat of passion
without express or implied mali~e.'~At trial, the judge instructed the jury
that if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide
was intentional and unlawful, then it could presume that the defendant
acted with malice aforethought and could find the defendant guilty of murder.40 If, however, the defendant had proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he acted in the heat of passion, then the jury was required to
find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime of man~laughter.~'Through
his instruction, the judge presumed that the "heat of passion" language of
the Maine manslaughter statute was an affirmative defense, proof of which
lay with the defendant.42 The trial judge's instruction to the jury allowed
the prosecution to rely on a presumption of implied malice, thus requiring
the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden
prov~cation.~~
The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed.""
On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued
that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the
35 Id. at 685-86.

The Maine murder statute, ME. REV. STAT.ANN., Tit. 17,§ 2651 (1964), provides:
Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life.
The manslaughter statute, ME. REV. STAT.ANN., Tit. 17, 8 2551 (1 964), in relevant
part provides:
Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years . . . .
Id. at 686 n.3.
36
Mullaney, 421 U.S.at 685. The argument continued that, at most, the defendant was guilty of
manslaughter since the act occurred in the heat of passion. Id.
37
Id. at 686 n.3.
38 Id.

39Id.
40

Id. at 686-87.

41 Id.
42

Id. at 686.

43 See State v.

Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 143-144 (Me. 1971). The trial court judge's jury instruction was as follows:
Bearing in mind, as I have said, that there has been an unlawful killing, that is one
not justified in self defense, then the killing is presumed to be with malice aforethought, and the burden is then upon the defendant, the killer, to satisfy the jury that
it was not done with malice aforethought either express or implied.
Id.
44 Id. at 687.
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element of malice aforethought by proving that he acted in heat of passion?' He argued that malice aforethought was the sole element that distinguished murder from manslaughter and that by having to disprove malice aforethought, he unconstitutionally had to assume the prosecution's
burden.46 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the defendant
and affirmed his con~iction.~~
It found that murder and manslaughter were
not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the single generic offense
of felonious homicide?' Thus, the heat of passion provision of the rnanslaughter statute was an affirmative defense to the greater crime of murder?'
The defendant appealed on a writ of habeas corpus to federal district
court, which disagreed with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. It ruled
that, under the Maine statute, murder and manslaughter were distinct offenses, not different degrees of the same offense." The court found that,
under Winship, the prosecution must prove malice aforethought beyond a
reasonable doubt.'' The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court, subscribing in general to the court's analysis and construction of the Maine law." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded it to the court of appeal^.'^ On remand, the
court of appeals again held that the Maine homicide statutory scheme vio45

State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 143-44 (Me. 1971).
at 143-44. As early as 1727, it had been held that "once the prosecution proved that the accused had committed the homicide, it was 'incumbent upon the prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction
of the court and jury' 'all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation."' Mullaney, 421
U.S. at 693-94 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 201); see also King v. Oneby, 92
1727); MICHAEL
FOSTER,A REPORT OF SOMEPROCEEDINGS
ON THE COMM~SSION
Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B.
FOR THE TRIAL
OF THE REBELS M THE YEAR1746, W THE COUNTY OF SURRY,AND OTHER CROWN
UPON A FEW BRANCHES
OF THE CROWNLAW296-97
CASES:TO WHICHARE ADDEDD~SCOURSES
(Michael Dodson ed., 3d ed. 1809). Thus, at common law, the burden of proving heat of passion lay
with defendant. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 694. In the 1975 Mullaney decision, however, the Court noted
that a majority of states require the prosecution to prove heat of passion. Id. at 696.
47 Wilbur, 278 A.2d at 149.
48 Id. at 144-146. The court noted that the law over the past century has been to place the burden
of proof on the defense to prove that the defendant acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.
Id. The Wilbur court also discussed the possible application of Winship. Id. at 146.
49 It is interesting to note that Winship was decided in 1970, four years after the defendant's trial.
In re Winship, 397 U.S.at 358; Wilbur, 278 A.2d at 146. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court noted this
fact, but "did not anticipate the application of the Winship principle to a factor such as the heat of
passion on sudden provocation." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688.
Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F.Supp. 149, 152-53 (D.Me. 1972).
51
Id. at 153.
52 See Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943 94547 (1st Cir. 1973). The court noted that "within
broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its own laws" but held that "a totally unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id. at
945. In the meantime, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine decided a similar case. See State v.
Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973). The LaJerry decision reaffirmed the holding in Stare v. Wilbur,
and rejected the First Circuit's ruling in Mullaney v. Wilbur. Id. at 661-64. In light of the conflict, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
J3 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
46 Id.
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lated due pro~ess.'~
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari."
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, declined to follow the analysis
of the lower federal courts.56 Instead, Powell held that the trial judge's
instructions erroneously placed the burden to disprove malice aforethought
on the defen~lant.~'Interpreting the absence of malice provision in the
Maine manslaughter statute as something other than a "fact necessary to
constitute [an element of] the crime," as had the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine, was held as inconsistent with our traditional notions of homicide."
Such a holding threatened to grant the legislature power to circumvent the
Due Process Cla~se.'~
In reaching its conclusion, the majority reasoned that the history of
punishing homicide crimes and the potential for legislative abuse necessitated its finding.60 Historically, only those homicides "committed in the
enforcement of justice" were deemed j~stifiable.~'Eventually, the class of
justifiable homicides was expanded.62 This expansion included "accidental
homicides and those committed in self defense.'*3 Still, in any other case,
Therefore, the
no affirmative defense existed to ameliorate p~nishrnent.~
Court held that the Maine homicide statute was un~onstitutional.~' The
Court viewed malice aforethought as an additional element that elevated
voluntary manslaughter to murder.66 In so finding, the Court rejected the
54 Wilbur

v. Mullaney. 496 F.2d 1303,1307 (1st Cir. 1974).
Wilbur, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
56
Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion and was joined by the entire court: Burger, Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall. Blackmun and Rehnquist. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684. Justice
Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 704. At the
outset, the opinion rejected the analysis of the district court and the First Circuit, thereby accepting the
Main5:upreme Judicial Court's construction of its state law. Id. at 690-91.
31
Id. at 701. The Court conducted a historical analysis, thereby showing why such an approach
is impermissible. Id. at 692-96.
58
Id. at 696-98. The Court noted that the state impermissibly, "affirmatively shifled the burden
of proof to the defendant." Id. at 701. It held that the "Due Pmess Clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion . . . ." Id. at 704.
59 Id. at 698-99.
60 Id. at 692-98.
6' Id. at 692.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See id. Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in McGautha v. Cali/ornia, 402
U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971). See also 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERJCK
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAWBEFORETHE TIMEOF EDWARD1 478-87 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1982) (1899) (explaining that, historically, homicide that was neither justifiable nor excusable was
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAWOF ENGLAND1-107
felonious homicide); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN,
(London, MacMillan 1883) (delineating the history of the law of homicide in its two forms: murder and
manslaughter).
6' Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04.
66
Id.
55
- - Mullaney v.
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petitioner's argument that the absence of malice was instead a defense to
murder.67
The greater concern raised by petitioner's argument was that, if accepted, it would allow legislatures to effectively allocate the burden of
proof for different elements of a crime.68 Petitioners argued that the Maine
statute, by requiring the deferidant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing was committed in the heat of passion, made the heat
of passion element an affirmative defense and thus not a "fact necessary to
constitute the crime" of felonious murder.69 The Court soundly rejected
this position.70 It reasoned that acceptance of the petitioner's argument
would extend Winship beyond its original intent.7' If legislatures were
permitted to label elements as those essential to prove a crime or as those
available to a defendant as affirmative defenses, they would be able to circumvent the process of proof.72
In Patterson v. New ~ork,'~the Court refused to apply Mullaney, holding that the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, an expanded notion
of heat of passion, did not negate an element of the crime of murder.74
Defendant Gordon Patterson shot and killed his estranged wife's boyhend
after spotting her "in a state of semiundress" in front of the victim. 75 The
defendant was charged with violating section 125.25 of the New York Penal Law which provides, in relevant part, that:
67 Id. at 697-98. The Court argued that the State was not concerned "only with guilt or innocence
in the abstract but also with the degree of culpability." Id. The law distinguishes those who kill in the
heat of passion from those who do not. Id. at 698. Therefore, the state views the former as "less
blameworthy." Id.
68
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99.
69 Id. at 697 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
70 Id. at 697-701.
7' Id. at 698 (stating that "Maine denigrates the interests found critical in Winship"). The Court
stated that Winship is concerned with substance rather than formalism. Id. at 699. Under the Winship
analysis, a court should look at the law as applied. Id.
" See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99. The State could therefore undermine many interests the
Winshi decision sought to protect. See id.
"432 U.S. I97 (1977).
74 Id. at 205-10. The Court noted that extreme emotional distress is a considerably expanded version of the heat of passion defense. Id. at 202. With the adoption of the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute ("ALI") departed from the heat of passion defense. See MODELPENALCODE 5 210.3
(1962). They adopted "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" as a defense to criminal homicide
that would mitigate a murder charge to manslaughter. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202. The test is whether,
"from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be," the homicide was committed, "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." Id. The test, therefore, includes both a subjective
element and an objective element. Whereas the test looks at the situation that gave rise to the extreme
emotional disturbance as the actor believed it to be, it must be reasonable that the event gave rise to the
pt 2, at 50. This
extreme emotional disturbance. See 1 MODEL PENAL CODEAND COMMENTAJUES,
new formulation of the law has created a larger class of cases that may be treated as manslaughter,
which would have otherwise been murder. Id. at 49.
75 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198. The defendant responded to the sight by shooting the boyfriend
twice in the head. Id.
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A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an
affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in
this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other
crime . . . .76
The defendant was convicted at trial and the Appellate Division affinned his c o n ~ i c t i o n .The
~ ~ defendant appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals arguing that the statutory requirement that he prove extreme emotional dist~rbance'~
violated his right to due process.79 The New York
Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument and held that the statute was consistent with due process.80
The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court." The Court
analyzed the New York statute and defined the extreme emotional disturbance element as a mitigating circumstance, thereby undermining the principles embodied in Win~hip.'~Justice White, writing for the majority, held
that those elements that a legislature defines as exculpatory or mitigating
do not negate an element of the substantive crime.83 Therefore, such a
76

N.Y. PENALLAW 8 125.25 (1998).
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 200.
78
At trial, the jury was charged that the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense b a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
7J
See People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976). The court noted that while Patterson's a peal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Wilbur v. Mullaney. Id.
s f Id. at 907. The court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that the New York statute did not
shift the burden to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged. Id. Specifically,
in New York, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance bears no direct relationship to
any element of murder. Id. at 907-08.
" See Patterson v. New York, 429 U.S. 813 (1976) (noting probable jurisdiction).
82
See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207. The Court explained that the defense allows a defendant to
show mental infirmity, which demonstrates less culpability. Id. at 206.
83 The Court declined to hold that a
[sltate must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance
affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. Here, in revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emo77
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statute does not violate a defendant's due process right^.^ The Court noted
that the legislature had taken great pains to ensure that innocent men would
not be convicted by placing a substantial burden on the prose~ution?~
However, "the risk [the prosecution] must bear is not without limits," and
"due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."86 The majority declined to "adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countqwde, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact constituting any and all afirmative defenses related to the culpability of an ac~used."~'
The majority distinguished Patterson from ~ullaney.8~
In the Maine
murder statute malice was the absence of provocation and, therefore, required the defendant to prove provocation as an element of the crimeaS9In
contrast, the New York statute-did not presume or imply extreme emotional
disturban~e,~
a concept that did not have deep historic roots in common
law?' Thus, according to the Patterson Court the extreme emotional distional disturbance, a substantially expanded version of the older heatsf-passion concept; but it was willing to do so only if the facts making out the defense were established by the defendant with sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to
undertake to establish the absence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps
fearing that proof would be too dimcult and that too many persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence need merely raise a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's emotional state.
Id. at 207. Justice Powell wrote for the dissent, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. Id. at
216. Justice Rehnauist took no Dart in the decision. Id.
84 ~ a t t e r s o n , U.S.
' ~ ~ at'210 (stating that the "Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which
the defendant is charged") Since "proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been
constitutionallyrequired," the Court was unwilling to depart from this standard. Id.
Id. at 208 (pointing out that this comes with the social cost that some guilty people will go
free).
86
Id.
Id. at 210 (relying, again, on the fact that proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses
has never been required in the past).
"Id. at 215-16.
See id. at 2 16; see also supra text accompanying40-41.
90 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 216.
91 At first, "the common law did not distinguish between murder and manslaughter." MODEL PENAL CODE6 210.3 cmt. 3 (1980). Later, courts began to make the distinction that murder required
"malice aforethought" while manslaughter did not. Id. Traditionally, then, manslaughter was the
absence of malice aforethought, but not a justification or excuse for the act. Id. The common law
further defined manslaughter as an intentional killing committed in the "heat of passion." Id. In the
Model Penal Code, extreme emotional disturbance was developed as a defense to murder from the
traditional heat of passion defense. See id. Thus, extreme emotional disturbance is a relatively new
defense. Just as heat of passion constituted manslaughter, extreme emotional disturbance mitigated a
murder charge to manslaughter. When New York adopted its current criminal code, it appropriated
almost word-for-word, the ALI formulation of extreme emotional disturbance in the Model Penal Code.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW 125.25 (1998).
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turbance provision did not negate an element of the New York murder stat~te.'~
Justice Powell, who two years earlier had written for the overwhelming
majority in ~ullaney:~wrote the dissent in Patterson, joined by Breman
and MarshallY4 According to the dissent, the majority opinion opened the
door to the very threats about which Justice Powell had warned in Mull~ney.~'
Powell wrote, "in the name of preserving legislative flexibility, the
court today drains In Re Winship of much of its vitality" and "surrenders to
the legislative branch a significant part of its responsibility to protect the
The Maine and New York Statues were
presumption of inr~ocence."~~
similar in that both provided the defendant with a less severe punishment
for acting in response to emotion." Powell recognized that the very reasons for its decision in Mullaney were vitiated in the majority's decision in
Patter~on?~By paying deference to the New York State Legislature and
upholding its definition of extreme emotional distress as an affirmative
defense to murder, the majority decision allowed "a legislature to shift,
virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a
criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of
that factor in the statutory language that defines the crime."99 Following
Patterson, states could "undermine" the Winship decision by redefining
elements to constitute different crimes.Iw
In McMillan v. ~ennsylvania,'~'
the Court first coined the phrase "sen92 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-16. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
93 Mullanev.. 421 U.S. at 684.
94
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting),
95
See id. at 221. Powell questioned how the Court could hold that the defendant's burden to
prove the heat of passion in Mullaney was invalid, while upholding New York's statute which requires
the defendant to prove extreme emotional distress. See id. at 221-22. Powell felt the difference between the statutes was "formalistic rather than substantive." Id.
96
Id. at 216 (Powell, J., dissenting ).
" ~ d at
. 199,212-213.
See id. at 224-25 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[ilt would be preferable, if the Court has
found reason to reject the rationale of Winship and Mullaney, simply and straightforwardlyto overrule
those precedents"). Powell went through a detailed analysis of why the case is similar to Mullaney and
requires the same conclusion. Id.
99
Id. at 223.
loo Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698 (stating that "if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a
crime as define by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to
protect. . . .").
lo' 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The petitioners, of whom there were four, were convicted of various
felonies enumerated in section 9712 of the Pennsylvania Code. Id. at 80. Under section 9712, the
petitioners were subject to a mandatory minimum five-year sentence if found by a preponderance of the
evidence to have visibly possessed a firearm. Id. at 81. The petitioners were convicted and, on appeal,
challenged the constitutionalityof the statute. Id. at 83. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the
petitioners' argument and upheld the statute. Id.

.
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tencing factor"'02 and considered whether proof of sentencing factor elements, like affirmative defenses, are exempt under Winship.lo3 Specifically, the Court considered whether Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act (the "Pennsylvania Act")lo4 violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it permitted punishment for
certain enumerated felonies to a mandatory minimum sentence of five
years imprisonment if the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence that the person "visibly possessed a fireann during commission of the ~ffense."'~' The legislation's language specifically provided
that "visible possession" was a sentence enhancement provision and not an
element of the crime.lo6
The issue in McMillan arose when four sentencing judges at separate
sentencing hearings, struck down the Pennsylvania Act because it did not
allow the jury to evaluate the element of "visible possession," which leads
The Commonwealth appealed and the Supreme
directly to p~nishrnent.'~~
Court of Pennsylvania reversed, concluding that the Pennsylvania ~ cwas
t
constitutional and consistent with due process.Io8 Justice Rehnquist wrote
lo2 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (stating that "[ilt was in McMillan v. Pennsylvania [ ] that this
Court, for the first time, coined the term 'sentencing factor'. . . ."). Andrew Fuchs argued that Apprendi "should be interpreted narrowly and need not invalidate the Guidelines because [it] does not
require juries to make Guidelines determinations using a reasonable doubt standard." Fuchs, supra
note 24, at 1400-01 (2001). Fuchs posited:
Sentencing factors are determinations impacting the length of a defendant's sentence
that a judge, rather than a jury, makes using the preponderance of the evidence standard. For example, after the jury has already convicted a defendant, judges routinely
decide the existence of such sentencing factors as narcotics quantity, whether anyone
was injured during the commission of the crime, the extent of victim injury, or
whether a weapon was involved.
Id. at 1400 (internal citations omitted).
'03 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83.
IW 42 PA. CONS.STAT.8 9712 (West 1998).
lo' McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 (quoting 42 PA.CONS. STAT.ANN.4 9712 (West 1998)).
Io6 The Pennsylvania Legislature specifically included language to prevent the due process challenge as well as to respond to the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson. See 42 PA. CONS.STAT.
ANN. 8 97 12(b) (West 1998):
Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to
the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the
Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined
at sentencing. The court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary
additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this
section is applicable.

Id.
107

See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82 (citing sentencing hearings).

108

See Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362-63 (Pa. 1985). The court noted that the
legislature has the responsibility of defining elements of crimes. Id. at 357. Furthermore, per the
Crimes Code, an element of an offense is conduct, attendant circumstances, or a result of conduct that
is included in the description of the offense, establishes the required kind of culpability, negates an
excuse or justification, negates a defense under the statute of limitations or establishes jurisdiction or
venue. See id. Because visible possession of a firearm is not included in the definitions of the felonies
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that the Constitution did not limit a state's power to define "elements" as
sentencing factors, and therefore, allowed removal of such "eleinents"
from the reasonable doubt ~ t a n d a r d . ' ~
The McMillan decision marked the Court's commitment to deferring to
the legislature's definition of a substantive crime. Relying heavily on Patterson, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Due Process Clause did not require
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any element that defines the "severity of punishment" of a particular crime."0 The Court held
that "the State legislature's definition of the elements of an offense is usually dispositive." Therefore, the Court should limit its inquiry to whether
the legislature's decision to assign the label of sentencing factor to an
element of a crime violated the Due Process Clause."' The Court opined,
"it goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much
more the business of the States than the Federal G~vernment.""~Here,
since the State had specifically stated that the "visible possession of a
weapon" element was not an element of the crime, it complied with the
Patterson requirements and, therefore, it was fair to require proof by a preponderance of the evidence."'
Thus, following McMillan: (1) the legislature's decision to link the severity of the punishment to the presence or absence of an identified fact did
not automatically subject that fact to the Winship requirements; and (2)
courts should consider the state legislature's definition of the element of
enumerated in section 9712 and it does not establish culpability required under those definitions, it is
clearly not an element of an offense. Id. Additionally, section 9712 applies only after a defendant has
been convicted of one of the enumerated felonies; therefore, f 9712 applies solely to sentencing proceedings. Id. In concluding that section 9712 violated the Due Process Clause, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated:
The effect of section 971 2 is merely to limit the discretion of the sentencing court in
the selection of a minimum sentence where it is determined that the defendant visibly possessed a fireann during the commission of the crime. The maximum permissible term of imprisonment remains unaffected. The defendant has no cognizable
right to leniency: Thus, although a finding that this particular sentencing Tactor is
present may have serious consequences for the defendant, we do not believe that a
defendant is subject to a section 9712 proceeding is in a position significantly distinguishable from that of other convicted defendants during the sentencing phase.
Id. at 362.
Io9 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87 (Justice Rehnquist noting that there are constitutional limits,
though not precisely defined in Patterson, to the State's power to define elements as sentencing factors). One such example is that the Due Process Clause precludes States from discarding the presumption of innocence. Id. at 87.
'lo See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.
Ill
Id. at 85 (noting that "[wlhile 'there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the
States may not go in this regard . . . [tlhe applicability of the reasonable doubt standard . . . has always
been depended on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case."') (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S.at 21 l n.12).
112
Id. (quoting lwinc v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)).
113
See id. at 85-86 (stating that "the present case is controlled by Patterson . . . rather than Mullaney. . . . [The] Pennsylvania Legislature has expressly provided that visible possession of a firearm is
not an elements of the crime[r).
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the offense as dispositive.'14 The Court left unclear the precise constitutional limits of a legislature's power to define the elements on an offense."'
The Court distinguished the Mullaney decision by concluding that
"[slection 9712 neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for a crime nor
creat[ed] a separate offense, calling for a separate ~enalty.""~Instead, "it
operat[ed] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in assigning a
penalty within range already available to it without the special finding of
visible possession of a
Therefore, following McMillan, courts
were limited in their ability to look far behind a legislature's rationale in
defining an element of a crime."'
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, raised concern that the McMillan decision did not comport with the Court's decision in Winship.Il9 He concluded that the factual finding of visibly possessing a firearm identified
"conduct that the legislature specifically intended to prohibit and to punish
According to Justice Stevens,
by a special san~tion."'~~
[Alppropriate respect for the rule of In re Winship requires
that there be some constitutional limits on the power of a
State to define the elements of criminal offenses. The high
standard of proof is required because of the immense importance of the individual interest in avoiding both the loss of
liberty and the stigma that results from a criminal conviction .
. . . [I]f a State provides that a specific component of a pro'I4

Id. at 84-85.

' I 5 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91 (finding that "[olur inability to lay down any 'bright line' test may

.

leave the constitutionalityof statutes more like those in Mullaney . . than is the Pennsylvania statute [,I
to depend on differences of degree, but the law is full of situations in which differences of degree
produce different results").
l i 6 Id. at 87-88.
' I 7 Id. at 88 (stating that "[tlhe statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the
visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense"). In rejecting the
petitioners' arguments, the Court noted that the statute does not expose one to greater or additional
vunishment. See id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated "[wlhether a particular fact is an element of a
criminal offense that . . . must be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt is a question
that must be decided by this Court and cannot be abdicated to the States." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He also noted that he would not rely on the distinction between aggravating
and mitigating facts, stating that he "would put off until next Term, [when the court determines Martin
v. Ohio] any discussion of how mitigating facts should be analyzed under Winship." Id. at 94. Marshall agreed with Justice Stevens' opinion which stated that "if a State provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that
component must be treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' within the meaning of the holding in In re Winship." Id.
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 103 (Stevens,. J.,. dissentinn).
-.
I2O Id. at 103-04. Justice Stevens wrote: "ln my opinion the Constitutional significance of the
special sanction cannot be avoided by the cavalier observation that it merely 'ups the ante' for the
defendant. No matter how culpable petitioner Denniston may be, the difference between 1 l '/r months
and 5 years of incarceration merits a more principled justification . . . ." Id. at 104 (citation omitted).

"'
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hibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and
to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a
"fact necessary to constitute the crime" within the meaning of
our holding in In re Winship.'"
In deviating from the principle of Winship, Mullaney and Patterson, the
majority decision circumvented due process by allowing the legislature to
define aspects of a crime that lead directly to punishment, but absolved the
prosecution of the highest burden of proof.'22
In Martin v. Ohio,123the Supreme Court continued its policy of deferring to the legislature's decision to define which elements the prosecution
must prove, and which the prosecution need not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt.lZ4 In Martin, the Court considered whether the Ohio legislature's
decision to label self-defense as an afirmative defense violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth ~mendment."~Ohio's aggravated muder statute made it a crime to purposely, and without prior calculation and
design, cause the death of another.Iz6 The state's self-defense statute provided an affirmative defense to the defendant if she could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she honestly believed she was in irnminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (2) that her only means of escape was to use force; and (3) that she had satisfied any duty to retreat or
avoid danger.''' The defendant, who was charged with shooting her husband, allegedly in response to a heated argument, claimed that the state
unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving self-defense to the defendant, since self-defense negates the "unlawfulness" implicit in every
and
crime.'" The Ohio Supreme Court rejected defendant's arg~rnent"~
the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.130The
Id. at 103.
See id. at 91-92.
480 U.S. 228 (1987b
,
See id.at 232-33.
Id. at 230 (questioning "whether the Due Process Clause . . . forbids placing the burden of
provin selfdefense on the defendant").
I t
OHIO REV. CODE8 2903.01 (Anderson 2002).
12' OHIOREV. CODE!j 2901.OS(A) states:
Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements of the offense is upon
the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative
defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused.
Id.
See Martin, 480 U.S.at 231. The defendant and her husband had fought over grocery money.
during which the defendant claimed her husband hit her in the head. Id. at 230-31. According to the
defendant, the victim came towards her as she was heading upstairs to retrieve her husband's rifle. See
idat 231.
State v. Martin, 488 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ohio 1986).
"O Martin v. Ohio, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986).
'I

"'

.

'"
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Supreme Court agreed with Ohio's highest court, concluding that the decision to define self-defense as an affirmative defense "founders on State
law,""' and that since the elements of murder and self-defense do not overlap, the legislature's decision to assign the burden of proving self-defense
to a defendant did not run afoul of the C~nstitution.'~~
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Powell concluded that the majority decision was flawed since it granted too much deference to the Ohio
1egislat~re.I~~
The majority failed to look beyond the Ohio legislature's
decision to shift the burden to the defen~lant."~The language of "prior
calculation or design" suggests that a defendant must have premeditated
the lulling.135 In contrast, under self-defense, the defendant must prove
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.'36 Someone in imminent
danger, who is threatened with great bodily harm, does not have time to
form a prior intent to
Consequently, proof of self-defense negates
the premeditation element of the Ohio murder statute.I3' Powell noted that
the Patterson decision was predicated on the Court's conclusion that the
defense of extreme emotional disturbance did not negate an element of
In contrast, the defense of self-defense was
New York's murder stat~te."~
more analogous to the situation presented to the Court in Mullaney, where
proof of a "heat of passion" supported a conclusion that a defendant could
Thus, under Mullaney and Patterson,
not act with malice aforeth~ught.'~~
the Court should have concluded that the Due Process clause prohibits the
defendant from having the responsibility to prove this element of the
crime.I4'
Powell, who was in the majority in Mullaney and dissented in Patterson, outlined what he thought would be the proper two-pronged test for
evaluating whether the legislature properly relieved the defendant of the
13' Martin, 480 U.S.

at 235.

132 See id. at 234. One example of when a state's decision would run afoul of the Constitution is

"if the jury had been instructed that selfdefense evidence could not be considered in determining
whether there was a reasonable doubt about the State's case." Id. at 233. That is, if selfdefense "must
be put aside for all purposes unless it satisfied the preponderance standard." Id. at 233-34.
'33 Id. at 236,240 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134
See id. at 241. Powell argued that the Court had "significantly, and without explanation" extended the deference granted to state legislation. Id. at 240. Generally, Powell felt the majority ignored
the real meaning of the holding in Patterson. Id. at 239.
13' See id. at 238. This elements is satisfied only when the accused has engaged in a "definite
process of reasoning in advance of the killing." Id.
''See id.
13' ~ dat. 239.
138

Id.

13' Id. at 240.
140

See Mullaney, 42 1 U.S. 684-85.
Martin, 480 U.S. at 239 (stating that "[iln many cases, a defendant who finds himself in imminent danger and reacts with deadly force will have not formed a prior intent to kill").
14'
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highest burden of proof.I4' His test took into account his concern that Martin granted the legislature too much discretion and that it ignored the historical treatment of problems of proof.IJ3 According to Powell, a state has
discretion to decide who has the burden of proving an element of a crime
if: (1) the factor does not make a difference between guilt and innocence;
and (2) the factor in question has not historically held that importance.t44
Under this analysis, generally courts cannot grant blanket deference to the
legislature in matters that trigger due process concerns and specifically,
courts cannot allow a state to put the burden of self-defense on the defendant.'45
In Alrnendarez-Torres v. United state^,'"^ the Supreme Court applied
the PattersodMullaney construct to federal legislation when it considered
whether Congress could properly define a recidivist provision in an illegal
immigration statute as a sentence enhancement rather than a "fact necessary to constitute the ~rirne."'~'Congress had enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a),
which authorized a prison term of no more than two years for any person
who was once deported and returns to the United States without permission.I4' Section 1326 created a recidivist provision, permitting a prison
term of up to twenty years if the previous deportation was subsequent to a
Almendarez-Torres
conviction for commission of an aggravated fe10ny.I~~
Subsequently, he
was previously convicted of three aggravated fe10nies.I~~
was in the United States and charged and convicted under 1326(a).lS1At
his sentencing hearing, the defendant argued that his indictment failed to
identify the three previous convictions and therefore did not set forth the
elements of the crime as required under 1326(b)(2).Is2 He argued, thereI4'See id. at 242 (stating "the State's authority in this respect was elaborated in the Patterson dissent, where I proposed two-& inquiry").
143
Id.
'44 Id. (holding that "[ilf either branch of the test is not met, then the legislature retains its traditional authority over matters of proof') (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 226-27).
145
See id. at 242-43 (noting that "[ulnder this analysis, it plainly is impermissible to require the
accused to prove self-defense.").
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
.
.
14' Id. at 239. However, Winship "did not consider whether, or when, the Constitution requires
the Government to treat a particular fact as an element, i.e., as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime,'
even where the crime-defining statute does not do so." Id. at 240. The issue before the AlmendarezTorres court was whether it was a violation of the defendant's due process for the hial court to treat the
provisions of 8 U.S.C. 8 1325@)(2)as sentence enhancements, rather than elements of the crime. Id. at
226.
148
8 U.S.C.8 1326(a) (2000).
14' Id. at 4 1326@)(2) (stating that if an alien's removal "was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such title, imprisoned not
more than 20 years, or both").
150
See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
151 Id.
Id.

a
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fore, that he could not be sentenced to more than two years in jail.Is3 The
district court rejected his argument, concluding that the provisions of §
1326(b)(2) were merely sentence enhancement^."^ On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit also rejected defendant's argument, relying on decisions by seven
of its sister circuits, which held that § 1326(b)(2) was merely a sentencing
pr~vision."~ The Ninth Circuit, however, was in disagreement as to
whether Congress had the authority to define a recidivist statute as a sentence enhancement. As such, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among j~risdictions.'~~
The Court stated that, within certain limits, it was Congress's prerogative to decide which factors were relevant to defining a crime and which
factors were relevant to sentencing.'" Moreover, the Court interpreted
Congress's intent as treating recidivism as a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense.'58 In addition, the Court recognized the consequences
of considering the "aggravated felony" language as an element of the
crime.'59 If such were the case, it would create undue prejudice to the defendant.la Requiring the prosecution to prove recidivism would obligate it
to present evidence at trial of defendant's prior con~ictions.'~'According
Id.
See id. The district court, consistent with the applicable sentencing guidelines range, imposed
a sentence of 85 months' imprisonment. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL
8 2LI.2 (2002).
IS5
United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 113 F.3d 515 (19%); see also United States v. Valdez,
103 F.3d 95 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that reentry after deportation after conviction of a crime is a
sentencing enhancement, not a separate offense); United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403 (8th Cir.
1996) (same); United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764 (3d. Cir. 1995) (same); United States v.
Palacios-Casquete, 55 F.3d 557 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Munoz-Cerna, 47 F.3d 207
(7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16 (2d. Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Crawford, 18 F.3d 1173 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. 1994)
(same ; United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).
' S e e Almendarez-Torres. 523 U.S. at 227-28; United States v. Gmlez-Medina, 976 F.2d 570.
572 (91h Cir. 1992) (holding that subsection @)(2) constitutes a separate crime)
See Almendarez-Torres. 523 U.S. at 228. The Court considered the legislative intent of the
statute to determine whether the "aggravated felony" provision of 1326@)(2) was merely a sentencing factor which authorized an enhanced penalty. Id. To decide whether this was a sentencing factor,
the Court looked to the statute's "language, structure, subject matter, context, and history-factors that
typical!^ help courts determine a statute's objective and thereby illuminate its text." Id.
158
See id. at 230. The Court noted that "the lower courts have almost uniformly interpreted statutes (that authorize higher sentences for recidivists) as setting forth sentencing factors, not as creating
new crimes (at least where the conduct, in the absence of recidivism, is independently lawful)." Id.;
see, e.g., United States v. Arango-Montoya, 61 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a provision "requiring a doubling of the mandatory minimum sentence . . . . was intended to be a sentencing
enhancement provision"); United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (holding that "a
statute establishing increased penalties . . . . did not establish [a] new criminal offense, but was [a] mere
sentence enhancement provision"); United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
the Armed Career Criminal Act "is a sentencing enhancement provision, but does not create a separate
indictable offense").
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234-35.
'60 Id. at 235.
16' See id. (stating that the "introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice"); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,560-61 (1998).
IS3
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to the Court, it was not Congress's intent to create such unfaimess for the
defendant.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, wrote that the congressional scheme
clearly defined two separate crimes, one for entering the country without a
previous conviction and one for entering the country with a previous conv i ~ t i 0 n . IMoreover,
~~
the legislative scheme did not label § 1326@)(2)as a
sentence enhancement. Thus, according to Scalia, the issue before the
Court was not a constitutional one, but merely one of statutory interpretat i ~ n . 'Under
~ ~ this conception, the Court would have to find in favor of the
defendant.I6'
Justice Scalia felt that the majority's blanket deference to Congress
"ignore[d] or distorte[d] [the analysis of] ~ c ~ i l l a n . "Unlike
' ~ ~ the statute
in McMillan, where the legislature had identified the provision in question
as a sentence enhancement, 8 1326(b)(2) had not been labeled as
Moreover, McMillan "merely limited the sentencing judge's discretion
within the range of penalty already available . . . ." unlike 5 1326(b)(2),
which substantially increased the defendant's potential sentence.I6' According to Justice Scalia, the majority's failure to sufficiently evaluate
Congress' rationale and appreciate the treatment of prior convictions in
which the maximum punishment is increased, as elements of the crime
threatened to substantially undermine the Court's prior interpretation of the
Due Process C1au~e.I~~
In Jones v. United States,'70the Court began to retreat from Patterson
and Almendarez-Torres. In Jones, the defendants held up the victims and
16* See Almendarer-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235 (stating that "we do not believe, other things being
equal, that Congress would have wanted to create this kind of unfaimess in respect to facts that are
almost never contended").
163
See id. at 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg also dissented. Id.
at 248.
164
Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
las Id.
166
See id. at 253 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16' Id. at 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168
Id. at 256.
Id. (noting that "many State Supreme Courts have concluded that a prior conviction which increases maximum punishment must be m t e d as an element of the offense under either their State
Constitutions"); see, e.g., Roberson v. State, 362 P.2d 11 15,1118- 1119 (0kla.Crim.App. 1961); State
v. McClay, 78 A.2d 347352-54 (Me. 1951); State v. Furth, 104 P.2d 925,930-933 (Wash. 1940); State
ex rel. Lockmiller v. Mayo, 101 SO. 228,231 (Fla. 1924); Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 68 Mass. 505,506
(1854) (prior conviction increasing maximum sentence must be set forth in indictment). As a matter of
common law, see, for example, State v. Pennye, 427 P.2d 525, 525-27 (Ariz. 1967); State v. Waterhouse, 307 P.2d 327,331-33 (Or. 1957); Robbins v. State, 242 S.W.2d 640,64344 (Ark. 1951); State
v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (lowa 1957); People v. McDonald, 206 N.W. 516, 518-20 (Mich.
1909); State v. Smith, 106 N.W. 187,
1925); People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 88 N.E. 3 8 , 3 9 4 (N.Y.
188 (lowa 1906) ("By the uniform current of authority, the fact of the prior convictions is to be taken as
part of the offense instantly charged, at least to the extent of aggravating it and authorizing an increased
punishment").
170 526 U.S. 227 (1998).
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struck one in the head with a gun.I7' The defendants were charged with
violating 18 U.S.C. 8 21 19, which provided:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from
the person or presence of another by force and violence or by
intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365
of this title, including any conduct that, if the conduct occurred in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, would violate section 2241 or 2242 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years,
or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or
sentenced to death."'
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution asked for a sentence of
twenty-five years because one of the victims had suffered serious bodily
inj~ry."~The defendant objected since sub-section (2) of the statute defined serious bodily injury as an element of the crime and the prosecution
had not pleaded that element in the indictment.I7' The trial court disagreed
and defined sub-section (2) as a sentencing factor. Since the judge found
serious bodily injury by a preponderance of the evidence, the twenty-five
year sentence was proper.I7' The defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
which agreed with the lower court and found that the serious bodily injury
The defendant then
language did not set out an element of the 0ffen~e.I'~
17' See id. at 229. During the hold up, one of Jones' co-felons stuck his gun in the victim's ear
and then struck him on the head with the weapon. See id.
172
18 U.S.C. 6 21 19 (1988).
. ,
'73 Jones, 526 U.S. at 231. The pre-sentence report recommended a 25-year sentence because
one of the victims had suffered serious bodily injury. The victim suffered a perforated eardrum, as well
as permanent hearing loss. Id.
174 See id.
17' See

id. at 231. In addition, Jones was given a consecutive 5-year sentence for the firearm of-

fense. Id.
"la See United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the structure of the statute, particularly the grammatical dependence of the numbered subsections on the first paragraph, demonstrated Congress's understanding that the subsections did not complete the definitions of separate crimes. See id. at 552-53. Additionally, the court relied on specific
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appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted ~erti0rari.I~~
In evaluating whether the trial judge's definition of bodily harm as a
sentencing factor was proper, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, articulated a loosely constructed two-pronged test.I7' First, Justice Souter
required the Court to consider the historical treatment of the factual assessment in question. This request was based on the fair assumption that
Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice
without malung a point of saying so.'79 Second, Justice Souter required the
Court must favor Congress' interpretation of a statute when a statute can be
construed in two ways, one of which is constitutionally permissible and the
other of which is not, "out of respect for Congress," which is assumed to
legislate in the light of constitutional limitation^.'^^
The Court concluded that subsection (2) was not merely a sentence enhancement, but set forth additional elements of the offense, which could be
removed from jury c~nsideration.'~' Subjecting the statute to Justice
Souter's test, the majority first found that historically, Congress had identified "serious bodily harm" as an element of an offense in several inalso found support in state legislation, which
stance~.'~'Justice
regularly defined "serious bodily injury" as an element of an offense.Ia3 In

outer

aspects of the statute's legislative history. See id. First, the heading on the subtitle of the bill that
created the provision was "Enhanced Penalties for Auto Theft," which the court viewed as meaning the
statute's numbered sections merely defined sentencing enhancements. See id. Second, the court noted
several references in the Committee Reports and floor debate on the bill to enhanced penalties for an
apparently single carjacking offense. Id.
177
Jones v. United States, 523 U.S. 227 (1998).
17'See id. at 234,239-40.
'79 See id. (stating that "[ilf a given statute is unclear about treating a fact as element or penalty
aggravator, it makes sense to look at what other statutes have done, on the fair assumption that Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of saying
so"). The opinion noted that the same approach was used in Almendarez-Torres, where the Court
st~essedthe history of recidivism as a sentencing factor. Id. at 235.
See id. at 239-40. This principle has "for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond
debate." Id. at 240.
18' See id. at 239-40.
18' See id. at 235; see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 5 928(bX2) (2000) (assault by a member of the armed
forces); 18 U.S.C. 137(aX1) (violence at international airports); id. $ 1091(a)(Z) (genocide). Cajacking is like robbery, on which the statute is patterned. Serious bodily injury has traditionally been
treated as an element of the offense of aggravated robbery. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 235.
See, e.g., ALA.CODE 13A-8-41(a)(2) (1994) (robbery in the first degree defined in part by
the causing of "serious physical injury"); ALASKASTAT.5 11.41.500(a)(3) (Michie 1996) (robbery in
the first degree defined in part by the causing of "serious physical injury"); ARK.CODE ANN.5 5-12103 (Michie 1997) (aggravated robbery; "[ilnflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical
injury"); CON. GEN.STAT. !j 53a- 134(aXl) (1994) (robbery in the first degree; "[clauses serious
physical injury"); IOWACODE 71 1.2 (1993) (robbery in the first degree; "purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious injury"); KANS.STAT.ANN. § 2 1-3427 (1995) (aggravated robbery; "inflicts
bodily harm"); KY. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 515.020(1Xa) (Michie 1990) (robbery in the first degree;
"causes physical injury"); N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. 636:1(III)(c) (1996) (class A felony of robbery;
"[ilnflicted or attempted to inflict death or serious injury"); N.Y. PENALLAW 5 160.15 (McKinney
1988) (robbery in the first degree; "[c]auses serious physical injury"); ORE.REV. STAT.5 164.415(1)(c)
(1990) (robbery in the first degree; "[c]auses or attempts to cause serious physical injury"); TEX.PE-
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contradicts the approach the Court followed in the previous term.Ig9 According to Justice Kennedy, under Almendarez-Torres the Court should
only consider the issue if the statute is "generally susceptible to two conHere,
structions after, and not before, its complexities are ~nraveled."'~~
the proper construction is even clearer than in Almendarez-Torrez. For that
reason, the majority, according to the dissenters, was wrong in its conclusion. The majority rejected Justice Kennedy's rallying cry and thus Jones
set the stage for the Court to abolish its practice of deferring wholesale to
the legislature on issues concerning assigning the burden of proving particular elements of a crime.
If the Jones Court began the retreat from the Patterson-McMillan doctrine of judicial deference to the legislature where defming the elements of
a crime is concerned, the Court in Apprendi v. New JerseyI9' completed the
withdrawal. In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm for unlawfbl purpose and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon
and was sentenced to an extended term under New Jersey's hate crime
statute
The statute under which the defendant was convicted provided
that possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose was punishable by
imprisonment for "between five years and ten years."'93 A separate "hate
crime" law provided for an increased imprisonment if the trial judge found,
"by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'the defendant in committing the
crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientaThe hate crime law authorized that an extended term
tion or ethni~ity.'"'~~
for second-degree offenses is imprisonment for "between 10 and 20
years."Ig5 The defendant was convicted and sentenced under both the
predicate statute and the hate crime law.196 He appealed to the Superior
Ig9 See id. at 266. Once again, Justice Kennedy stressed that the constitutional doubt methodology is incorrect in light of Almendorez-Torres. Id.
190
Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres,523 U.S. at 238). Kennedy noted the Court found insufficient ambiguity to warrant the use of the constitutional doubt principle in Almendarez-Torres. See id.
19' 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
.
.
'92 Id. at 470-71. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor dismissed 20 other counts
against Apprendi. Id.
'93 See id. at 468 (quoting N.J. STAT.ANN. 4 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
194
Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT.ANN.4 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.2000)).
.-- Id. at 469 (quoting N.J.STAT.
19'
ANN4 2C:43-7(a)(3)).
IY6
Id. at 471. As part of the plea agreement the state resewed the right to request the court to
impose a higher "enhanced" sentence on the ground the offense was committed with a biased purpose.
Id. at 470-471. At the same time, Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the hate crime sentence
enhancement on the ground that it violates the U.S. Constitution. Id. After the trial judge accepted the
three guilty pleas, the prosecutor filed a formal motion for the extended term. Id. The hial judge then
held an evidentiary hearing to determine Apprendi's purpose for the shooting. Id. Based on the evidence presented, the judge found the crime motivated by racial bias, "with a purpose to intimidate" as
provided by the statute. Id. Thus, the hate crime enhancement applied. The judge also rejected Apprendi's Constitutional challenge. Id.
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Court, Appellate Division, which, relying on McMillan, affirmed the lower
court r~ling.'~'The defendant then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which affirmed the deci~ion.'~' On appeal, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. lg9
The Court considered whether the "hate crime" sentence enhancements
as defined by the New Jersey legislature was constitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
The Apprendi Court,
following the decision in Jones, concluded that it would look to the statute
at issue, rather than its prior practice of deferring to the legislature and its
label of "hate crime" as a sentence enhan~ernent.'~'In evaluating the statute, the Court considered the effect that the legislative label has on punishment, the historical background for defining sentencing factors, and the
potential for legislative abuseS2O2
The Court found that under the New Jersey scheme, the judicial finding by a preponderance of the evidence exposed the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's verdictzo3 The Court noted
that, historically, it interpreted the Due Process Clause to "demand . . . a
19' State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also McMillan
v. Pennsylvania. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). The court found the state legislature decided to make the hate
crime enhancement a "sentencing factor" rather than an element of the offense. The court characterized
the required finding as one of "motive" and not an element of the offense unless the legislature so
arovides. Aoorendi. 698 A.2d at 1270.
19' State v. Apprendi. 731 A.2d 485,497 (N.J. 1999). The court explained the due process only
requires the State to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated:
merely because the legislature has placed the hatecrime enhance within the sentencing provisions of the Code of Criminal Justice does not mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an essential element of the offense Were that the
case, the Legislature could just as easily allow judges, not juries to determine if a
kidnapping victim has been released unharmed.
Id. at 492.
The court then undertook an inquiry, looking at many factors, to determine the hate crime provision was valid. The statute, in the court's view, did not create a separate offense calling for separate
penalties, but rather, the legislature simply took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment and dictated the weight to be given that factor. Id, at 493-96.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,468-69 (2000) (considering "whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in
the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt").
20' Id. at 476 (stating that their "answer . . . was foreshadowed by [their] opinion in Jones v.
United Stotes . . . . [tlhe Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a
state statute"). The Court also noted the "relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect-does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict?" Id. at 494.
'02 Id. at 476-90. The Court summarized that "our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of
the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion we expressed in Jones." Id. at 490.
'03 Id. at 491. For this reason, the Court held the practice under the New Jersey statute "could not
stand." See id. at 490-91.

..

'*
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higher degree of persuasion" in order to successhlly prosecute a crime.204
Here, the New Jersey legislature threatened "certain pains" for unlawfully
possessing a weapon and additional pains for intimidating his victims
based on race.'05 The Court found that, "as a matter of simple justice . . .
the procedural safeguards designed to protect [the defendant] from unwarranted pains should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has singled out for p~nishrnent."~"~
The Court also raised concerns that accepting the New Jersey legislature's definition of a hate-crime as a sentence enhancement ran the risk of
?~~
if left to stand, the
which the Court warned in M ~ l l a n e ~Specifically,
New Jersey legislature would have effectively circumvented the protections of Winship merely by "redefining the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of
p~nishrnent."~~'
The Apprendi Court concluded that with the exception of facts regarding prior convictions, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the proscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.209For the first time since Mullaney, the
Court limited the legislature's ability to assign the burden of proof by labeling an element of a crime as a sentence enhancement. Moreover, following Apprendi, courts would no longer have to pay great judicial deference to legislative decisions. Instead, they could conduct their own analysis, as to whether a legislative label of a particular element ran afoul of the
due process rights of the C~nstitution."~
Justice O'Connor's dissent was critical of the majority's decision to
"cast aside" the Court's prior practice of deferring to the legislative labeling of elements of a crime.2" She warned that the majority decision would
require Courts to look into the area of the law that was delegated to the
legislative
Her dissent also criticized the majority for relying too
'04 Id. at 478 (finding that the degree of persuasion has crystallized into the formula "beyond a
reasonable doubt"). This rule seems to date back to 1798. See id.
205
Id. at 476. Thus, merely "using the label 'sentence enhancement"' to describe the latter surely
does not provide a principled basis for treating them differently. Id.
z06 Id.
'07 Id. at 494-95; see also supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
Id. at 485 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S.at 698).
'09 Id. at 490 (confirming the holding in Jones regarding prior convictions).
210
Id.
21 1
Id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor felt the majority had rejected the
Court's traditional cautious approach, in exchange for a new bright line rule. Id.
Id. at 550-51 (O*Connor,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor felt the most "significant impact"
of the majority's decision would be the effect it may have on sentencing conducted under the federal
and state determinate sentencing guidelines. Id. Since she felt the Court deemed such guidelines
unconstitutional, many people currently serving sentences under those guidelines would "flood" the
courts seeking to invalidate their sentences. Id. at 551. This could equal up to one half million cases.
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heavily on Mullaney in its analysis and decision and disregarding the postMullaney and McMillan decisions, which had created mounting precedent
in favor of legislative deferral on matters of assigning burdens of proof.213
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, charged that the new Apprendi rule
created a "procedural ideal" that juries would be the sole determiners of the
existence of facts upon which punishment
Indeed, the weight of
Breyer's criticism was aimed at the likely effect of the Apprendi decision,
in returning to the jury the role of deciding beyond a reasonable doubt
those facts for which the defendant will be punished.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, criticized both the majority and Justice Thomas' concurrence for their "expansive readingw2"of ~ u l l a n e ~ . ~ ' ~
According to the dissent, the Apprendi ruling has the potential to overrule
P~tterson.2'~Justice O'Connor wrote that in Patterson, the defendant's
failure to prove extreme emotional disturbance would result in a conviction
of murder.218The penalty for murder in New York State far exceeds that of
rnan~laughter.~~~
Consequently, extreme emotional disturbance could be
considered a "fact" that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum and, therefore, must be submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable
Apprendi illustrates the Court's retrenchment from its view that the
legislature is the dispositive authority on which statutory language requires
proof beyond a reasonable do~bt.2~'
The decision marks a retreat from the
litany of cases, beginning with Patterson, which upheld the judicial princiId. Also, she noted the decision leaves state and federal judges in limbo when it comes to sentencing.
See id. at 51.
Id. at 529-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that the Court ignored the
Patterson case, which rejected an extensive reading of Mullaney. Id. at 530. Also, the same reasoning
was conducted in Jones and Almendarez-Torres. See id. at 532.
214
Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer noted this ideal cannot work in the "real world of
criminal justice." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Scalia, in a very briefconcurrence,
spent all his time the criticizing the Breyer dissent. See id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
216
See id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
217
Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
Id. (OIConnor, J., dissenting).
See N.Y. PENALLAW 8 125.15 (West 1998) (stating that "[m]anslaughter . . . is a Class C felony"); N.Y. PENAL LAW 8 125.25 (West 1998) (stating that "[mlurder . . . is a Class A-l felony"); N.Y.
PENAL LAW 8 70.00 (West 1998) (enumerating that sentence of imprisonment for a Class A felony
"shall be life imprisonment" and that the term for a Class C felony "shall not exceed fifteen years").
220
Appredi, 530 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1969) (finding that "[llest there remain any doubt
about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged"), with Pattmon v. New York,
432 U.S. 197,207 (1977) (rejecting the proposition "that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment").
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ple that courts should pay great deference to legislatures in matters concerning their definitions of crimes.222The Court's renewed commitment to
evaluate for itself whether a legislature's definition of a crime is appropriate sounds a call to return to the pre-Patterson days of Winship and Mullaney.
111. DEFINING
A FRAMEWORK
FOR ANALYSIS

A. A Critical Review of the Post-Winship Cases
It was well understood prior to Winship and Mullaney that, as a general
matter, the language in a pamcular criminal statute defined the corpus of a
crime.223Following Patterson, however, legislatures could include in their
statutes language that seemingly defined the crime, but which was exempt
from the requirements of Winship, if it was labeled as a sentence enhancement or an affirmative defense. For the years beginning with Patterson
and through Almendarez-Torres, legislatures had great discretion to label
elements of a statute as they saw fit. It was not until the Jones and Apprendi cases that the Court tightened the reigns on legislatures. In these
cases the Court found, similar to Mullaney, that, at least where sentence
enhancements are concerned, the presumption in a particular statute favors
interpreting its language to be comprised of "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged."224 Indeed, the
Apprendi decision marks a clear return to the principles of Mullaney, at
least where sentence enhancements are concerned.
The Apprendi ruling does not make clear, however, how it portends for
those cases concerning affirmative defenses.22' Read literally, Apprendi
only limits a court's review of sentence enhancements. Many critics, however, suggest that a liberal reading of Apprendi could close the door on the
legislature's ability to shift the burden of proving affirmative defenses to
the defendant.226Should the Court extend its ruling, it would clearly mark
222

See McMillan discussion, supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text; see also Harmelin v.
Michigan 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (upholding a mandatory life sentence for possession of cocaine against an Eight Amendment challenge). Justice Kennedy concluded in a separate opinion that
fixing prison terms "is properly within the province of legislatures not courts." Id. at 998 (Kennedy, J.,
concuning in part and concuning in the judgment) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,275-76
(1980 )
See WAYNE R LAFAVE,CRIMINAL
LAW8 (3d ed. West 2000).

'"
224

--- Apprendi, 530 U.S.at 477 (quoting Winshi' 397 U.S.at 364).

LL3

The Mullaney-Jones-Apprendilitany grew out of decisions that considered the constitutionality of affirmative defenses. See cases in@ Part 11.
226 See King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1481-82. Others argue that while the Apprendi issue resembles the controversy over "affirmative defenses", the legislature's likely greater willingness to push
the outer limits of the formalistic approach set forth in Apprendi will result in a failure to provide the
controversy necessary to review such a case. See also Joseph L. Hoffrnann, Apprendi v . New Jersey:
Back to rhe Future?, 38 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 255,279-80 (2001); Sundby, supra note 24, at 46 (identifying three main schools of thought on the scope of the reasonable doubt rule).
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a return to Mullaney, prohibiting legislatures from defining an affirmative
defense in such a way that excludes it from jury c~nsideration.~~'
Expansive proceduralists argue that under Apprendi there is sound reasoning for a return to Mullaney. According to this school of thought, the
reasonable doubt rule attaches to every fact affecting the defendant's
criminal liability.228 In his article, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the
Meaning of Innocence, Professor Sundby wrote that Mullaney represented
the closest that the Supreme Court had come to adopting the expansive
proceduralists' view.229 "By evincing willingness to look beyond the
state's designation of who bore the burden of persuasion, the Court has
raised a 'Mullaney question' regarding any factor significantly affecting
the defendant's conviction and punishment."230 Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Apprendi supports Professor Sundby's conclusion by noting that the
case concerned "the distinct question of when a fact that bears on a defendant's punishment, but which the legislature has.not classified as an element of the charged offense, must nevertheless be treated as an offense
element."23'
The Apprendi decision provides the Court with an opportunity to overrule Patterson and to return to Mullaney, thereby prohibiting legislatures to
reallocate the burden of proving affirmative defenses.232However, such a
suggestion begs the question of whether, twenty-five years after the Mullaney decision, it would be appropriate for the Court to so do. Moreover,
given the decisions following Mullaney through Apprendi, is such a return
truly consistent with the Court's parameters of the Due Process Clause?

B. The Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi Construct: A Two-Pronged Test
The cases taken as a whole provide a nice framework for analyzing
whether Apprendi should extend to affirmative defenses. In reaching its
decision, the Apprendi and Jones Courts relied heavily on the same reason227 See King & Klein, supra

note 24, at 1481-82.
Sundby, supra note 24, at 464. In his article, Professor Sundby defines what he terms as two
strains of proceduralism. Id. Under expansive proceduralism, the court may not distinguish between
elements, sentence enhancements or affirmative defenses. Id. Indeed, if facts A, B, and C are each part
of a crime, then the prosecution must prove each of these beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 464. Under
expansive proceduralism, the reasonable doubt rule attaches to every fact affecting the defendant's
criminality, including the absence of defenses. Id. at 465. In converse, under restrictive proceduralism,
the classification of a fact is up to the state, but once classified as an element of the crime, the prosecution must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 471.
229
Id. at 466.
230 Id. at 469.
23 1
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,527 (2000) (O'Connor J., dissenting).
232 It is appropriate to rely on cases concerning sentence enhancements to define the law for affirmative defenses because: (1) The court uses same precedent for both; (2) in both instances the issue
is whether the legislature can permissibly remove proof of an element from jury consideration and; (3)
they both affect punishment.
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ing that the majority articulated in M ~ l l a n e y . ~Unlike
~ ~ the Martin,
McMillan, or Almanderez-Torres cases, which seemed to defer, almost
wholesale, to the legislatures, the Apprendi, Jones and Mullaney Courts
considered certain factors to help themselves and lower courts evaluate the
permissibility of shifting the burden of proving a non-essential element of a
crime.234 Read together, Mullaney, Jones, and Apprendi articulate a clear
two-prong test for hture courts to consider when evaluating whether the
legislature may permissibly shift the burden of proof in a criminal prosecution.
In almost every post- Winship case, the majority placed significant emphasis on the historical importance of an element when considered in the
context of the Due Process Clause.235In Mullaney, Jones, and Apprendi,
the Court looked to legislative history prior to the Civil War to find support
for its conclu~ion.~" Mullaney, Justice Powell relied on an in-depth
historical review of the murderlmanslaughter distinction, concluding that
the historical distinction dictated the Court's conclusion that the prosecution could not shift the burden of proof for heat of passion to the defendant.u7 In Jones, Justice Souter relied on Congress's unlikely intention to
radically depart from past practices.238In Apprendi, Justice Stevens found
that the Court's "reexamination" of history dictated its ruling that the legislature may not automatically designate an element of a crime as a sentence
enhan~ement.')~ The Almendarez-Torres Court relied on the history of
treating recidivism as a sentencing factor in declaring that a prior conviction was not an element of a crime."0
The other common theme among these cases was the concern for potential legislative abuse.241In Mullaney, the Court found the potential for
233 See supra notes

I5 and accompanying text.

U4 See supra Part 11.
235 See, e.g., supra

Part II.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 244-48; Mullaney, 421

U.S. at 692-96.

237 See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER,THE LIMITSOF THE
CRIMMAL
SANCTION
136-39 (1968) (discussing the standard of proof in criminal cases); George P.
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Buden of Persuasion Practices in Criminal Coses, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 903-07 (1968) (analyzing the development of burden-of-proof rules for
criminal defenses).
238 Jones, 526 U.S. at 234 (pointing out that statutes must be viewed with the "fair assumption
that Congress is unlikely to intend any radical departures from past practice without making a point of
sayin so").
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Note that in his dissent in Martin, Justice Powell said we must
look to the historical importance of the element when considering whether it is a fact necessary to prove
the crime. Martin, 480 U.S. at 242 (Powell, J., dissenting).
240
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243-44.
24 1
See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 73840 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alerting the
Court to the slippery slope of legislative denial of defendants' constitutional protections through the
creation of Constitution-eluding sentence enhancements).

'
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future legislative abuse as support for its decision.242In Jones, the Court
expressed concern that "recognizing an unlimited legslative power to authorize determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury
would invite erosion of the jury's function to a point against which a line
must necessarily be drawn."243 The Apprendi Court seemed to reach its
conclusion in part to curtail the legislative abuse that had grown out of the
post-Mullaney decisions.
The Mullaney/Apprendi/Jones construct clearly articulates a twopronged test for evaluating the legislature's ability to define "factors that
bear solely on the extent of puni~hment."~"Specifically, courts must consider two questions: (1) do the historic principles of punishment demand
that the burden of proof remain with the prosecution? And (2) does allowing the legislature to allocate the burden of proof pose the risk of permitting it to impermissibly overstep its boundaries?
1. The Historic Principles of Punishing the Conduct in Question

a. The Historic Principles of Defining Affirmative Defenses for
the Purposes of Punishment
Assigning the burden of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant
is well rooted in early common law. As early as the 1300s, prosecutors
were charged with proving the defendant's criminal act beyond a reasonAS a result, the defendant could not call witnesses or hire an
able
attorney.246 A defendant could only present evidence of a defense to the
King after conviction, as a means to mitigate punish~nent.~~'
The crimes for which one could be charged during this time were limited in number and in scope.248Similarly, these crimes were traditionally
punished by death or great bodily harm.249Because of the severe punish-

242 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99 (pointing out that a state could undermine the safeguards of due
process by recharacterizing substantive elements of a crime as factors that relate to the punishment of
the crime).
243 Jones, 526 U.S. at 244.
2" Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.
245 THEODORE
F.T. PLUCKNET?,
A CONCISE
HISTORY
OF THE COMMON
LAW438 (Little, Brown
& Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929).
246 Id. The theory behind such a rule was that if the Crown proved its case, that was the end of
the matter. Id. On the other hand, if it did not, that failure would be apparent in spite of the silent
defense. Id. Thus, the need to call witnesses or hire an attorney were "superfluous." Id.
247 See id. at 445. For examule.. in case-s of homicides involvina self-defense or misadventure.
248 Id. at 442-51. The felonies included treason, murder, manslaughter, larceny, receiving stolen
goods and attempt crimes. Many other crimes fit into the common law felony category. For example,
blackmailing became a constructive robbery felony, before it was made expressly criminal by statute in
1722. Id. at 451.
249 J. M. BEATTIE,CRIME
AND THE COURTSM ENGLAND1660-1800, at 451 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1986). For example, in the 1660s those convicted of treason were given punishment aimed at
inflicting the maximum of pain and ignominy. Id. The convict was to be hanged, cut down while still

.

-
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ment, defendants were usually successful in their presentation of defenses
on appeal to the King and were generally awarded a criminal pardon.250
The rise in pardons in the late 1300s led the House of Commons to adopt a
statute calling for a general limit on the issuance of pardon^.^" Consequently, defendants were limited in their venues in which to argue their
justification or excuse for committing a particular crime.252
In the early eighteenth century, defendants first were permitted to call
witnesses in their defense at triaLzS3 Those charged under the Church's
criminal justice system assumed the burden of proving their innocence.254
The prosecution at such trials assumed a passive role.255 Although this
seemed unduly harsh, the defendant's burden necessitated the presentation
of a defense on his behalf.256 These trials generally consisted of the defense merely presenting evidence of an excuse, justification, or wrongful
prosecution.
Non-secular judicial tribunals rejected the canonical system of allocating the burden of proof to the defendant in favor of retaining the judicial
safeguards inherent in proof by the
Viscount Snakey L.C.
best articulated this principle, stating "[t]hroughout the web of English
criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of
the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to . . . the defense of
insanity."258 This common law principle of our Due Process Clause, however, did not prohibit the judge from shifting the burden of proving certain
alive, disemboweled and castrated, beheaded and quartered. Id. Also, convictions for rape were often
supra note 245, at 451.
punished by mutilation. PLUCKNETT,
250
PLUCKNETT,
supro note 245, at 445 (noting that "the prerogative of mercy was the only point
at which . . . medieval criminal law was at all flexible"). The liberality with which pardons were
granted gradually lead to the classification of different levels of homicide. Id.
251 Id. at 445-46. An earlier statute started this movement in 1328. Id. at 445. The Act called for
restraint in issuing pardons due to the ease with which such pardons were granted. Id.
252 Id. at 446. The 1390 statute recognized certain pardons as issuing from Chancery as a matter
of course, in cases such & self-defense or misadventure. Id. The statute contrasted pardons for murders done in "in await, assault, or malice prepcnse." Id. In these types of cases pardons were almost
impossible to secure. Id.
253
Id. at 438.
254 Id. This was known as the canonical system, and was applied to eighteenth century clergy and
to laymen who had been tried under the Church's criminal jurisdiction.
255
Id. In fact, the prosecution could call no witnesses. Id. This led to a rise in acquittals. Id.
The procedure basically involved an exculpatory oath by the accused, twelve compurgator oaths, evidence of the accused, and a jury verdict. Id. at n.2.
256
Basically, the accused had to prove his innocence. Id. The assumption was made that if the
accused was innocent he ought to be able to demonstrate it for the ju~y. Id. Thus, the accused took on
an active role. Id. The idea that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty did not become
an active principle until about 1820. BEATTIE,
supra note 249, at 341.
257 GLANVILLE
WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL
LAW882-88 (2d ed. 1961).
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A.C. 462,481 (1935).
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defenses to the defendant.259The English Common Law permitted the defendant to present proof of the defense of mistake, intoxication, duress,
necessity, and self-defense.260
Proof of these defenses remained with the defendant as America developed its own body of law. Indeed, the American Law Institute codified
each defense in the Model Penal Code ("MPC").Z6' Most of these defenses
appear separate fiom the substantive crimes defined later in the MPC. For
example, MPC 2.04 provides that the defendant has a mistake of fact or
law defense to a substantive crime upon proof of certain ~onditions!~~
However, in some instances, the defense is defined within the context of
the statute.263MPC 210.3 Manslaughter provides that a homicide, which
would otherwise be murder, is manslaughter if committed under the influThe MPC is inconsistent, howence of extreme emotional di~turbance.2~~
ever, concerning allocation of burden of proof. MPC 2.04(3) clearly allocates the burden of proof to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, where as MPC 210.0 is silent regarding which bears the burden of
proving that the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance.265
As a general matter, legislatures and courts have failed to define or
create affirmative defenses in the past century. With the exception of the
defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which is really just an expan259 WILLIAMS,
supra note 257, at 885. This idea, that the burden shifts to the defendant to make
out defenses, was not confined to homicide charges, but rather was of general application in all charges
under the criminal law. Id.
260 SIR JAMES FITZ~AMES
STEPHEN,A DIGESTOF THE CRJMMAL
LAW15-21 (McMillan & Co.
1877) (providing examples of actual statutes providing for such defenses, as well as others such as age
supra note 257, at 885 (stating that "it is the duty of the prosecution
and insanity); see also WILLIAMS,
to prove the prisoner's guilt, subject to . . . the defence of insanity and subject to any statutory exception.") (internal citations omitxed).
I' '
Section 2.04 of the ~ o d e Penal
l
Code ("MPC") defines the "Ignorance or Mistake" defense.
It expressly requires a defendant prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The Intoxication defense is provided for in 2.08, and Duress is explained in 2.09. Neither section expressly assigns
the burden of proof. Likewise, necessity (3.02) and selfdefense (3.04) also assign no express burden
of proof. MODELPENALCODE$4 2.04,2.08,2.09,3.02,3.04(Official Draft 1962).
262
MODELPENALCODE6 2.04 (Official Draft 19621
See id. The defense is only available if the ignorance or mistake negatives the mental requirement required to establish a material element of the offense or if the law provides that the state of
mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. Id.
264 The statute reads:
(1 ) Criminal Homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
(a) it is committed recklessly; or
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
Id. 6 210.3.
" 265
Interestingly, the statute at issue in the Patterson case, N.Y. PENALLAW5 125.25, is patterned upon § 210.3 of the Model Penal Code. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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sion of the common-law heat of passion defense, and the defense of entrapment, virtually all the defenses codified by legislatures existed at common law.2MFor the most part, therefore, the notion of affirmative defenses
and their definitions are a reflection of the American judicial system, as it
existed over 200 years ago.
b.

he' Historic Principles of Punishing Conduct Defined as
Sentence Enhancements

In contrast to affirmative defenses, sentence enhancements are a creature of the modem legislat~re.~"American criminal law, while based on
common law crimes, is now predominately statutory. Over the past two
centuries, legislatures have embraced their authority to define criminal
conduct.268 As a general rule, legislatures define substantive crimes
broadly in terms of the act and intent elements, typically defining the appropriate level of punishment for the broad categories of crimes' in a separate part of the criminal code.269
While the trend leaned towards defining crimes generally, some legislatures included specific attendant circumstances in the traditional common
Originally
law crimes, proof of which resulted in a greater puni~hment.~'~
the prosecution was required to prove these attendant circumstances be266 See STEPHEN,
supra note 260, at 15-21. Stephen's work, written in 1877, shows the prevalence of aftirmative defenses at that point in time. See id. The author describes in detail, and provides
statutory examples of, the defenses contained in the MODELPENALCODE,including insanity, drunkenness, compulsion, ignorance of law, and ignorance of fact (mistake). See id.
267
KATESTITH& JOSE A. CABRANES,FEAROF JUDGING 9-38 (University of Chicago Press
1998). Like affirmative defenses, sentencing was historically not reviewable (discussing the history of
sentencing in the United States) there were no sentence enhancements at common law.). See Stephanos
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World ojGuilt, 110 YALE L.J. 1097,
1124 (2001).
STITH& CABRANES.
, suora note 267. at 22-23.
269
For example, the New York State Penal Code Part Two-Sentences, contains Article 55,
"Classification and Designation of Offenses," N.Y. PENALLAW$ 55.00 (McKinney 1998). There, $
55.05, "Classification of felonies and misdemeanors," provides that "Felonies are classified, for the
purpose of sentence, into five categories," classes A, B, C, D, and E. Likewise, this section classifies
misdemeanors as classes A, B, or unclassified. N.Y. PENALLAW4 55.05 (McKinney 1998). Article
60, "Authorized Dispositions of Offenders" and Article 70, "Imprisonment," then proscribe the punishment for each classification of felony or misdemeanor. N.Y. PENALLAW$$ 60.00, 70.00 (McKinney 1998). For example, $ 70.00, "Sentence of imprisonment for felony," sets the maximum term of
sentence and minimum period of imprisonment for each class of felony. N.Y. PENALLAW$ 70.00
(McKinney 1998). $ 55.10 then provides that for felonies, "the particular classification or subclassification of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section or article defining it."
For misdemeanors, "each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is either a class A misdemeanor or class
B misdemeanor, as expressly designated in the section or article defining it. N.Y. PENALLAW$ 55.10
(McKinney 1998). For example, $ 140.15, Criminal trespass in the second degree, provides that "[a]
person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling," and states that "[clriminal trespass in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor." Do you also want to put in federal sentencing guidelines? At the federal level, the federal
sentencing guidelines are also separate from the federal criminal code.
270 Attendant circumstances are those conditions that must be present, in conjunction with the
prohibited conduct or result in order to constitute the crime.

.
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yond a reasonable doubt since they were part of the broader substantive
crime.2" However, following Winship,legislatures began to define elements in terms of "facts necessary to prove the commission of a crime,"
and those that merely elevate or mitigate punishment.272
The notion of an increased sentence in certain circumstances absent
proof beyond a reasonable doubt existed in the early 1900s. When legislatures began to include additional requirements to a crime, the proof of
which would result in a higher sentence. Instead of attendant circumstances however, the factors had no substantive relationship to a particular
crime. The forerunners of sentencing factors or sentence enhancements
were statute provisions generally targeted at habitual offenders.273 These

27' For example, New York Penal Code, j! 140.20 defines burglary in the third degree as knowingly entering or remaining in a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and labels it a class D
felony, which under 5 70.00 carries a punishment fixed by the court but which cannot exceed seven
years. NEW YORK PENALLAW $4 140.20,70.00 (McKinney 1998). 4 140.25, burglary in the second
degree, begins with the same exact definition, but includes the attendant circumstances of either being
armed with explosives or a deadly weapon, causing physical injury to a non participant in the crime,
using or threatening use of the dangerous instrument, displaying what appears to be a firearm, or the
building being a dwelling. NEW YORKPENALLAW8 140.25 (McKinney 1998). The additional element raises the level of the crime up to a class C felony, which under 70.00 is also fixed by the court,
but carries a prison term of up to fifteen years. NEW YORKPENALLAW4 70.00 (McKinney 1998).
272 See N.J.Rev. Stat. 2C:l-13 (2003) (defining which language of a criminal statute requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and which language does not require such proof); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. 5 13-3601(L) (2003) (defining sentence enhancements for certain offenses against a pregnant
victim); Cal. Penal Code 4 452.1 (2003) (defining sentence enhancements for aggravated arson); Mo.
Rev. Stat. 4 578.425(2) (2003) (permitting sentence enhancement for criminal conduct by gang members "committed on the grounds of, or within one thousand feet of a public or private elementary,
vocational, junior high or high school . . . ."); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 486
(2000) (stating that "constitutional limits exist to States' authority to define away facts necessary to
constitute a criminal offense. . . .").
273 ,
,In the early 1900s, sentence enhancements in state penal codes were based on the defendant
being a habitual criminal. The 1915 Missouri case of State v. Collins discussed the state's habitual
criminal act. 180 S.W. 866, 867 (Mo. 1915). This case upheld an earlier decision which held that the
section of a state statute "prescribing greater punishment for a second offense than for the first is not
unconstitutional, either upon the ground of putting a person twice in jeopardy or prescribing different
punishments for different persons committing the same offense." Collins, 180 S.W. at 867; see also
State v. Moore, 26 S.W.345 (Ma. 1894). A similar state statute was discussed in the 1920 Connecticut
case of State v Riley. 110 A. 550 (Conn. 1920). It dealt with Connecticut's Indeterminate Sentencing
Act (CONN.GEN. STAT.1918, §6660), which provided that "in the case of one or two prior convictions
the penalty for the new offense on which the defendant is tried and convicted may be made severer than
when there is no prior conviction." Riley, 110 A. at 551. The court held that prior convictions in another jurisdiction can be used to enable it to apply the statute, which provided that "when any person so
sentenced shall have twice before been convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in a state prison or penitentiary, the court shall sentence said person to a maximum of thirty years." Id. at 552. As precedent
for its decision, the court cited decisions upholding similar provisions in New York, Massachusetts, and
West Virginia. Id. at 552-53. All three cases recognized that "the punishment is for the new crime
only, but is the heavier if [the defendant] is an habitual criminal. The allegation of previous convictions is not a distinct charge of crime, but is necessary to bring the case within the statute, and goes to
punishment only." Id. at 552. This principle was affirmed in federal court in the 1934 case of Goodman v Kunkle which in analyzing the Indiana Habitual Criminal Statute, holds that "habitual criminality
is a state, not a crime." 72 F.2d 334,336 (7th Cir. 1934). Moreover, "[hlabitual criminal statutes, such
as that of Indiana, do not create or define a new independent crime, but they prescribe circumstances
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provisions were written by legislatures in an effort to provide additional
specific and general deterrence to repeat criminals.274
In addition to using sentence enhancements as a means to punish habitual criminals, in the early 1900s legislatures began proscribing sentence
enhancements where a certain factor existed on top of a base crime.275
These specific elements of the crime were indistinguishable from attendant
circumstances. Unlike attendant circumstances, however, the legislature
maintained that these discrete elements did not make up the corpus of the
crime and therefore, the requirements of the Due Process Clause did not
attach. For example, in 1935 the California State Legislature amended its
penal code to increase the punishment for kidnapping in instances where
the victim suffered harm. In People v. Tanner, 276 the defendant challenged
the amendment, which only required proof of harm after the jury convicted
the defendant on the underlying crime.277 The California Supreme Court
agreed with the legislature's assessment of "harm to the victim" as a sentence enhancement and upheld the statute as permissible and appropriate
pursuant to the state's principles of punishment.278
wherein one found guilty of a specific crime may be more severely penalized because of his previous
criminalities as thev are alleged and found." Id.
274
See Collins, 180 S.W. at 867 (finding that "in case of a second conviction, the penalty shall be
severer because by the defendant's persistence in the perpetration of crime he has evinced a depravity,
which merits a greater punishment"). Early habitual offender statutes, which allowed for an increased
punishment for an individual who had been previously convicted of the same crime, were challenged as
violative of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against Double Jeopardy. See id. In Collins, the defendant challenged the Missouri habitual offender statute R.S. 1909, 84913, which provided that "in case
of a second conviction the penalty shall be severer." Id. at 866. The court upheld the statute holding
that a defendant's repeat defense evinces a depravity, which merits a greater punishment. Id. at 868.
Some states created enhancements for a second conviction for a specific crime. In State v.
McClay, 78 A.2d 347 (1951), the Maine Supreme Court considered a challenge to a statute that provided both the substantive offense and the sentence enhancement in the same statute. That statute
provided that:
Whoever shall operate or attempt to operate a motor vehicle . . . when intoxicated . .
. upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100, nor more than
$1000, or by imprisonment for not less than 30 days, nor more than 1l months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment. Any person convicted of a 2nd or subsequent offense shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 3 or more than I I months,
and in addition thereto, the court may impose a fine as above provided.
Id. at 349.
The court held that the increased fine was a permissible sentence enhancement because "for a first
offense the court may impose a lesser punishment than it must impose for a second or subsequent
offense." Id.
275 See Peoole v. Tanner. 44 P.2d 324.330
(Cal.
.
. 1935).
276 44 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1935).
277 Id. at 331.
278 Id. (claiming that the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an amendment to the state kidnapping law that increased a defendant's punishment if the kidnap victim suffered harm). There, "[aln Act
to Amend Section 209 of the Penal Code relating to the punishment of kidnapping," provided that upon
conviction of kidnapping a defendant "shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment for life
without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the person
or persons subjected to kidnapping suffers or suffer bodily harm." Id. at 294. If the victim did not
suffer bodily harm, the punishment was only imprisonment in state prison for life with possibility of

-
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Perhaps the most significant proliferation of sentence enhancements
came in 1984 when Congress adopted the Sentencing Reform Act, otherwise known as the Federal Sentencing guideline^.'^^ "The . . . Guidelines
supplement congressionally enacted [substantive criminal laws]. Within
the statutory minimum and maximum set for the offense of conviction, the
conduct for which a defendant will be punished is determined by the confluence of factors that the Sentencing Commission has decided are relevant
as punishment."280 For example, 21 U.S.C. 5 844 provides that no person
shall possess LSD."' If after conviction of the crime, the prosecution can
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed the
LSD in prison, his punishment is automatically increased by six months to
a year.282 The sentencing guidelines permit proof of over four hundred
sentence enhancements that can contribute to an increased sentence.283
Sentence enhancements allow legislatures to easily accomplish the
parole. Id. In this case, the defendant "challenged the procedure and questioned the motives of the
members of the legislature who were pressing the passage of said amendment." Id. at 297. The court
rejects this argument, and holds that "the suggestion that it was the result of an aroused public feeling
against kidnapping is no reason why it should be condemned as invalid. Perhaps every measure
adopted is the result of a public need or demand." Id. at 297. This is still evident today, as California
has adopted provisions for enhanced sentences if a defendant intentionally inflicts injury on a pregnant
woman causing termination of pregnancy, or discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle causing paralysis. CAL. PENALCODE 4 12022.9 (West 2002).
279
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated to regulate sentences imposed by federal judges. The guidelines sought to promote fairness, certainty and uniformity in sentencing. See
STITH& CABRANES,
supra note 267. THE 1984 Act is most significant, Congress had adopted sentence
enhancements previous to the act. The 1970 Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act, 21 U.S.C. 3 801 contained a sentence enhancement provision, addressed in the 1974 case
United States v. Noland. 495 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1974). The case approves the procedure which the
prosecution must follow to establish a defendant's previous conviction for the purpose of an increased
punishment. Id. at 531. The statute requim that the prosecution provide an information stating "in
writing the previous convictions to be relied upon" before trial or entry of a guilty plea. Id. Besides the
familiar repeat offender basis, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act contains provisions for
increased sentences based on aggravating factors, for example if a drug offense occurs near where
children might be:
Any person who violates $841(a)(l) or section 856 of this title by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or
within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary, vocational or secondary school or a public or private college, junior college, or
university, or a playground, or housing facility owned by a public housing authority,
or within 100 ft of a public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video
arcade facility is ... subject to (I) twice the maximum punishment authorized by
§841(b) of this title; and (2) at least twice the term of any supervised release authorized by section 841(b) of this title . . . .
21 U.S.C. 4 860 (2000).
280 STITH& CABRANES,
supra note 267, at 77.
21 U.S.C. 4 844 (2000).
282 ST~TH
& CABRANBS,
supra note 267, at app. D. In calculating a defendant's sentence pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who is convicted of possessing 20 grams of LSD
would be guilty of a Level 6 Offense, which cames with it a sentence of 0-6 months. If the defendant
possessed the LSD in a prison, the Sentencing Guidelines require the Offense Level to be raised to a
level of 13, which cames with it a 12-18 month sentence. Id.
283 18 U.S.C. 44 3351-59,3561-66,3571-74,3581-86;28 U.S.C.$5 991-98 (2000).
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principles of punishment by increasing the duration of one's loss of liberty
upon proof of a standard that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. For
this reason, they are attractive commodities to lawmakers. As legislatures
began to codify traditional common law crimes in the early 1800s, the use
of sentence enhancements became an effective way of ensuring legislative
grading for more serious offenses, not because of the defendant's higher
intent level, but instead because of an increase in the severity of the result.
Consequently, in the past half-century there has been a proliferation of
sentence enhancements.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Monge v. California:84recognized the current trend among legislatures to substitute sentence enhancements for
criminal convi~tions.~~'
Sentence enhancements allow popularly-elected
legislatures to boast of a quick response to crime in the street, and have
thus become a speedy means to accomplish the goals of punishment among
legislatures in this country.286 As a result, Constitution-eluding sentence
enhancements have, in a sense, become the darling of the legislatures.
2 . The Risk of Abuse when a Legislature Is Permitted to Allocate the
Burden of Proof for a Particular Element

a. The Risk of the Legislature Abusing its Power when Defining
Affirmative Defenses
Most jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code have adopted the
affirmative defenses that existed at common law.287Many criminal codes
include a provision defining the standard of proof for affirmative def e n s e ~ Other
. ~ ~ ~than the fairly recent trend toward codification of common
law
legislatures have failed to exercise their muscle in a way
284

397 U.S. 358 (1970). See generally Stephanos Bibas, Article, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World ojGuilty Pleas. 110 YALEL.J. 1097 (2001).
285 Bibas, supra note 284, at 1110-1 1.
286 See, e.g., Andrew Little, Comment, Caught Red-Handed: The Peculiarities of the Federal
Schoolyard Statute and Its Interpretation in Be F~j?hCircuit, 31 TEX.TECHL. REV. 245, 273 (2000)
(noting that "[p]opularly elected legislators are quick to respond to a vocal constituency demanding
stiffer enalties for drug dealers).
MODELP ~ u f i C o o E(4 2.04,2.08,2.09,3.02,3.04(Official Dratl 1962).
288
See, e.g., State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 99 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that "[tlhe State in a
criminal prosecution is bound to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. That burden cannot be shifted to the defendant, even when a defendant is asserting an affirmative defense."). New Jersey Criminal Code would require the state to disprove this affirmative defense
beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.J.STAT.ANN.( 2C:I-13b(2) (West 1995) (declaring that under this
default provision, where an affirmative defense is silent as to the standard of proof, and there is any
evidence to support the defense, the prosecution must disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
289 State v. DeCastro, 913 P.2d 558 (HI App. 1996) (rev'd on other grounds) (calling Hawaii's
codification of Section 2.04 of the Model Penal Code a recent codification of a common law defense).
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that would allow the defendant to avail himself of a defense.290
In limited circumstances, however, legislatures have defined new affirmative defenses for existing traditional common law crimes.29' The
MPC's adoption of the extreme emotional disturbance defense is the best
example of a new defense that did not exist at common law.292Some jurisdictions have created an affirmative defense to felony murder upon showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was not individually culpable for the murder.293The New Jersey Legislature created a
new affirmative defense of being in a public place in the context of lawful
conditions that can be imposed upon remaining in a gambling casino.294
These limited instances whereby legislatures have created new affirmative
defenses seem to be the exception rather than the rule?95
The more common trend is to limit rather than to expand the category
of affirmative defenses. The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984:% for
example, significantly limited the insanity defense and completely eradicated "diminished capacity" and "diminished responsibility" as affirmative
defen~es.2~~
In Hawaii, a recent attempt to make Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance ("EMED) an affirmative defense, which would have
required defendants to establish EMED by a preponderance of the evidence, was vetoed by the governor.298 The absence of a proliferation of
new affirmative defenses indicates little likelihood for legislative abuse.
See King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1546. Since the Pauerson case, nine additional states
have adopted a statute that requires the defendant prove extreme emotional disturbance in order to
mitigate murder to manslaughter. In total, 12 states have such a statute.
Donald Baier, Arizona Felony Murder: Let The Punishment Fit The Crime, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
701, 703-04 (1994). In keeping with recent trends, the Arizona Legislature recently proposed an affirmative defense to felony murder as part of its 1992 Criminal Code Revision Bill. Id. at 702-3. The
defense would allow a defendant to escape a first degree murder conviction by proving that he was not
individually culpable for the murder. Id. However, the governor vetoed the bill, singling out the
afirmative defense as a major stumbling block. Id.
See discussion suora Da. 44-45.
293
See, e.g., Gardiner v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished decision); 1999
U.S. App. LEXlS 14066, at *3 (Jwe 22, 1999) (interpreting Section 9A.32.030(1)(c) of the Revised
Code of Washington).
294 Carnpione v. Adamar of New Jersey, 155 N.J. 245, 267 (App. Div. 1998) (analyzing the
criminal trespass statute's affirmative defense of being in a public place in the context of lawful conditions that can be imposed upon remaining in a gambling casino); see also James L. Fennessy, New
Jersey Law and Police Response to the Exclusion of Minority Patrons From Retail Stores Based on the
Mere Suspicion ofShoplifring. 9 SETONHALL CONST.L.J. 549, 550, 562-66 (1999) (analyzing "New
Jersey public accommodations laws relating to our hypothetical minority customer's right to access a
retail store").
295 Many jurisdictions that have adopted the defense of extreme emotional disturbance are now
abandoning its use. Among the states that have adopted the Model Penal Code, relatively few enacted
the Code version of voluntary manslaughter; moreover, a substantial number of the ones that did reverted to the common law formulation after only a short time. See SANFORD
H. KAD~SH
& STEPHEN
J.
SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASESAND MATERIALS
423 (6th ed. 1995).
'% 18 U.S.C. $ 17 (1988).

"'

.

. c

297 See id.

298 Statement Of Objections To Senate Bill No.

1119, 1999 Leg. Sess., Senate J. 802-03.
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The absence of legislative abuse contradicts Justice Powell's prediction
in Mullaney. The Court's past decisions, which consistently granted legislatures great deference in assigning the burden of proof, did not lead to
abuse where a f f m t i v e defenses were concerned. 299 Instead, legislatures
have remained remarkably restrained in their ability to exempt from full
jury consideration elements of a crime that could mitigate a defendant's
g~ilt.~''
b. The Risk of the Legislature Abusing its Power when Defining
Sentence Enhancements
The Apprendi Court points squarely to the concerns Justice Powell
raised in Mullaney regarding affirmative defenses. To uphold New Jersey's statutory scheme defining "hate crimes" as sentence enhancements
will allow legislatures to abuse the system and to eviscerate the Constitutional mandate of Winship. Over the past quarter-century, legislatures have
easily embraced the kind of freedom about which Justices Powell and Stevens warned.302Since the Court first coined the term in McMillan, defendants from almost all states and federal jurisdictions have waged hundreds
of different claims, challenging the constitutionality of such provisions.303
Legislatures at both the state and federal level have adopted sentence
enhancements as a short-cut method to increase the likelihood of punishment for more violent or potentially threatening crimes. In their article,
Essential Elements, Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein identify a
significant number of instances in which state legislatures amended their
codes to include sentence enhancements following the Court's endorsement of similar statutes in other states.304Perhaps this legislative freedom
is most prolific in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which Congress
adopted in 1987.305 Kate Stith and Jose Cabranes, in their book Fear of
299 King & Klein, supra note 24, at n.82 (finding that "[tlhe option of creating affirmative defenses 'has not lead to such abuse or such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required"') (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 21 I).
300 Id.
301
However, following Mullaney, Justice Powell's words rang somewhat true. Following Patterson, nine jurisdictions adopted the Patterson language defining extreme emotional disturbance as an
affirmative defense to murder. See id. at 1546, Appendix A. In addition fifteen states legislatively
adopted the Court's ruling in Leland v. Ohio that the defendant must prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (citing 343 U.S. 790 (1952)).
302
See supra Part I (discussing recent court decisions).
303
See, e g . , Underwood v. United States, 15 F.3d 16 (2nd Cir. 1993) (defendant argued that his
sentence should be vacated because a sentencing judge, rather than a jury, found his conduct continued
past a particular date. The court upheld the sentence.).
304
King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1546, Appmdix A.
305 18 U.S.C. $5 3351-59,3561-66,3571-74,3581-86; 28 U.S.C.58 991-98. For a general discussion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see STI'I'H & CABRANES,
supra note 267, at 3 (stating
that "the sentencing guidelines are rules promulgated by the sentencing commission for the regulation
of the criminal sentences imposed by federal judges").
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Judging, suggest that the guidelines, which provide punishment based on
proof of the amount of drugs one transports or the degree of violence involved in a particular crime, are really just an adjunct of the substantive
criminal law?06
The post- Winship increase in sentence enhancements is understandable
given the ease with which the legislature can pass statutes and the deference that courts pay when considering the wisdom of legislative choice.
Crime is a bi-partisan issue and, as such, members of legislatures can easily
join together to pass bills to ensure that those committing violent crimes
are easily removed from the street. Once passed, the Court had, prior to
Jones and Apprendi, adopted an almost blind-eye toward questioning the
wisdom of removing from the jury those facts that could lead to an enhanced sentence.307 The Court's great deference arguably sent a wellheeded signal to legislatures that sentence enhancements, as part of particular criminal statutory schemes, are both appropriate and useful if the legislature deems them as

The Supreme Court is likely to ignore the rally cry from strict procedualists should it revisit the constitutionality of a legislature's decision to
assign the burden of proving affirmative defenses to a defendant. Indeed, it
would be appropriate to do so. Under the Jones/Apprendi/Mullaney construct, the Court's reasons for retreating from broad legislative deference
when sentence enhancements are challenged are not necessarily present
when affirmative defenses were called into question.
Since McMillan, when the Court first coined the phrase "sentence enhan~ement,"~'~
it has treated the inquiries into the constitutionality of senThis is approtence enhancements and affirmative defenses identi~ally.~'~
priate given the commonality between them. Both sentence enhancements
and affirmative defenses remove from the jury the ability to decide their
proof beyond a reasonable d ~ u b t ; ~both
" directly affect the amount of pun306 See generally STITH
& CABRANES,
supra note 267, at 38-77 (discussing the invention of the
sentencing guidelines). The guidelines provide 258 separate criteria by which judges must evaluate a
defendant's characteristics and the characteristics of the crime, proof of any of these will increase or
decrease punishment. Id.
307 See discussion supra Part 11.
The Court's deference to legislatures where crimes are concerned is not new. See Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S.957,988 (1991) (finding the only issue to be "whether the possible dissemination
of drugs can be as "grave" as the possible dissemination of heavy weapons. Who are we to say no?
The members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the sbeets of Detroit.")
309 Bibas, supra note 237, at 1103.
3'0 See discussion suora Part I.
311 See discussion supra Part 111.
r
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ishment that a court will assign and although the derivation of each is from
common law, both are current creatures of the legislature.
Although sentence enhancements and affirmative defenses share
enough similarities that the Court has predicated its analysis of the constitutionality of one squarely on the evaluation of the other. An analysis of
affirmative defenses under the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct yields a
result that is quite different from that of sentence enhancements. For this
reason, it would be inappropriate for the Court to revive Mullaney.
As stated above, in order to invalidate the legislature's ability to shift
the burden of proving affirmative defenses the Court must find, as it did
with sentence enhancements, that (1) the historic principles of punishment
demand that the burden of proof remain with the prosecution; and (2) allowing the legislature to allocate the burden of proof poses the risk of permitting it to impermissibly overstep its boundaries. The results from this
inquiry yield a different result depending on the type of "factors that bear
that the Court is subjecting to consolely on the extent of puni~hment,"~'~
stitutional scrutiny.
A. Do the Historical Principles of Punishment Demand that the Burden of
Proof Remain with the Prosecution?
Historically, statutory schemes trigger due process concerns when the
legislature decreases the rigid burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
for an element that "makes a substantial difference in punishment and
~tigrna."~"Since Mullaney, however, the Court has never expressed any
clear due process concerns with factors that can hlly exonerate a defendant
or those that have the effect of extending punishment unless such punishment is extended beyond the statutory maximum for the underlying
crime.314As a general matter, the Court has not imposed the reach of the
Due Process Clause beyond those factors upon which proof would increase
the defendant's loss of
The Court has always limited a legislatures ability to assign a lesser
burden of proof to a factor in a criminal trial if it can "be shown that in the
Anglo-American legal tradition, the factor in question" has historically
made the difference between guilt or inn~cence."~When considering the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the Court noted that
proof of the defense had traditionally led to a lesser punishment, not to
complete exoneration. Therefore, the due process guarantees did not apApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,485 (2000).
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,226 (1977).
314
See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,93 (1986); Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224,248 (1998).
See discussion supra Part I.
'I6 Patterson. 432 U.S. at 226.
3'2

313
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ply. In contrast, Mullaney prohibited the legislature from switching the
burden of proving a heat of passion defense to the defendant.317It reasoned
that the statutory scheme defining the defense absolved the prosecution of
the requirement to prove an element that was necessary for c~nviction.~"
The Court has only allowed the legislature to relieve the prosecution of its
burden of disproving an affirmative defense where the defense has not led
to a complete acquittal.
Since the Patterson decision was limited to consideration of a partial
defense, one could argue that under current law a legislature may not shift
the burden of proving an affirmative defense that would fully relieve the
defendant of culpability. However, under the Court's mandate of limiting
due process protection to instances where shifting the burden has not historically been permitted, it seems inappropriate to extend the law back to
Mullaney. Affirmative defenses were originally offered by the defendant
post-conviction as a means to mitigate punishment. Eventually, mitigating
defenses were allowed at trial, but the burden of proving them remained
with the defendant. A defense, it was reasoned, explained the defendant's
justification or excuse for a substantive crime. It did not go to the corpus
of the crime for which defendant was being punished. The courts, as a
general matter, have not historically extended due process guarantees to
affirmative defenses.
In contrast, sentence enhancements have traditionally been used solely
as a means to lengthen the loss of one's liberty. Although the earliest sentence enhancements appeared in the mid-1700s, the use of elements to increase punishment, rather than to prove culpability, proliferated following
the Court's decision in Winship. Because Winship required prosecutors to
prove "every fact that constitutes the crime" legislators began drafting language that they deemed separate from the crime, despite the fact that it led
directly to punishment. The Court sanctioned this practice in McMillan
when it said, "the Due Process Clause did not require the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt any element that defines the severity of
punishment of a particular crime."319
To date, the Court seems more concerned with limiting due process
guarantees rather than extending them. As it stated in Patterson, "Due
Process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever
cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person."320 For
the past eight centuries the burden for proving afirmative defenses has
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,703 (1975).
Id. at 702-03.
319
McMillan. 477 U.S. at 84; see McMillan discussion, supra pp. 17-22.
320 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208; see Patterson discussion, supra pp. 13-17.
318
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largely remained with the defendant.32' For this reason, the historical principles of punishment do not demand that the burden of proof remain with
the prosecution. It is therefore unlikely that the Court would reverse the
current trend and now require the prosecution to prove all affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Does Allowing the Legislature to Allocate the Burden of Disproving an
Aflrmative Defense to the Defendant Pose a Risk of Permitting it to
Impermissibly Overstep its Boundaries?
Under this prong of the inquiry, the Court may not extend the Apprendi
rule to include affirmative defenses. To be sure, the Court has repeatedly
raised concerns that allowing the legislature great deference to decide
which factors in a substantive crime must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt can lead to an erosion of the Due Process Clause.322 However, the
slippery slope has not extended to legislative abuse of defining affirmative
defenses.
The current catalogue of available affirmative defenses almost completely reflects those available at common law. In fact, many jurisdictions
have begun a retreat from one of the more recent statutorily created defenses, that of extreme emotional disturbance.323In contrast, legislatures
have fully embraced their ability to define sentence enhancements as a
means to eviscerate the due process requirements of the C~nstitution.~"
The Apprendi Court seemed to base its decision in large part on the concern that the New Jersey legislature effectively circumvented the protections of Winship by characterizing elements as "factors that bear solely on
the extent of punishment."325 There is no demonstrable evidence that legislatures have taken advantage of their power by reallocating the burden of
proving a defense or defining new affirmative defenses. Therefore, allowing the legislature to continue defining affirmative defenses will pose a risk
of permitting it to impermissibly overstep its boundaries. For this reason,
the Court could not retreat to Mullaney under the second prong of the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct.
The concerns of potential legislative abuse first raised by the Court in
Mullaney and echoed through out the litany of cases that followed do not
seem apparent where affirmative defenses are concerned. Ironically it was
321 See supra Part II.A.l. The historic principles of defining affirmative defenses for the purposes
of punishment.
322 See Mullaney. 421 U.S. at 698 (noting that if legislatures were permitted to label elements due
process may be circumvented); Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 (interpreting the statute in a manner in which
"serious bodily harm" was deemed a sentence enhancement would raise serious questions under the
Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's notice and jury bial guarantees).
323
See discussion supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
324
King & Klein, supra note 24, at 1524, app. A.
325 State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485,485 (N.J. 1999).
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in a case that called into question the legislature's ability to define affirmative defenses as "factor[s] that bear solely on punishment," which called
the potential for abuse into question. However, the abuse that Justice Powell warned of seemed to only extend to the legislature's use of sentencing
factors.326Thus, extending the Apprendi rule to affirmative defenses would
fail under prong two of the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct.

The Court should not limit the legislature's ability to assign the burden
of proving affirmative defenses to the defendant. In a perfect world, the
legislature would never be able to assign the burden of proof away from
the prosecution. Once the legislature defines a crime, the reasonable doubt
rule should attach to every fact affecting the defendant's criminality.
However, the Court has not allowed for such a world. To echo Justice
Rehnquist, in Herrera v. C~llins,'~'there are limits to the Court's obligation to ensure that innocent men do not get convicted.328Consequently, the
Court will only prohibit the legislature from shifting the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt away from the prosecution where the historic
principles of punishment demand otherwise and where allowing for legislative "manipulation" poses the risk of allowing the legislature to impermissibly overstep its boundaries. The original derivation of affirmative defenses placed the burden on the defendant to show why punishment was
not appropriate for his particular actions. Moreover, the legislative abuse
to which the Court responded in Jones and Apprendi seems to occur in
instances where legislatures are defining sentence enhancements and not
when legislating affirmative defenses. Thus, the reasons for limiting the
legislature where sentence enhancements are concerned are not apparent
when subjecting affirmative defenses to similar scrutiny. Therefore, under
the Mullaney/Jones/Apprendi construct, it is unwise and even unnecessary
to extend Apprendi to affirmative defenses.

326 ~

~ ~ r e n731
d iA.2d
, at 485.

"'506 U.S. 390 (1993).
328 See id.
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